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Federalizing Bank Governance 
David Min* 
Congress and federal financial regulators have long prioritized the safety 
and soundness of banking firms. But at the same time, the directors and 
officers of banking firms are legally bound to prioritize shareholder wealth 
maximization, which creates incentives for risk-taking that work against 
these regulatory goals. This shareholder primacy norm has long been a 
central feature of corporate governance, but as I describe in this Article its 
application to banks was not a deliberate policy choice but rather a 
historical accident. Indeed, banks possess several unique features that make 
shareholder wealth maximization an inapt governance priority for them. 
Banks are highly leveraged, which increases the importance of creditor 
agency costs. Banks also enjoy government guarantees, either explicit or 
implicit, on their short-term debt, and thus their governance is a matter of 
public concern. Finally, bank failures result in high negative externalities, 
and this also creates a strong public interest in bank safety and soundness. 
This Article argues that a new federal governance regime for banking 
institutions is appropriate and consistent with the historical purposes of 
banking regulations and charter oversight in the United States. 
Furthermore, such a regime would reduce the tensions between the law of 
state entities and the sprawling federal banking regulatory framework 
created by Congress, and harmonize the internal governance of banking 
firms with the broader goals of external banking regulations. Finally, I offer 
some thoughts on the key principles that should be present in any such 
federal governance regime for banking. 
For too long, we have tolerated a “cat-and-mouse” dynamic in banking, 
one in which regulators have sought to identify and address risky practices 
while knowing that the directors and officers of banking firms have strong 
incentives to take on higher risk. By changing this paradigm and realigning 
the incentives inherent in banking governance, we can take a major step 
towards ensuring long-term stability in our financial system. 
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paper, and I would also like to thank Charles O’Kelley and the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on 
Corporations, Law & Society for hosting the conference where the genesis of these ideas came 
about. And of course, I want to thank my wife Jane for her amazing and unwavering support. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is generally undisputed that the excessive risk taking of banks and 
other leveraged financial companies (LFCs)1 was a primary cause of the 
2007–08 financial crisis,2 which wreaked massive damage to the 
financial system and the broader economy.3 But why did LFCs take on 
 
1. As I have previously noted, the term “bank” is one that is used quite inconsistently, both in 
popular parlance and in the law and economics literature. See David Min, Understanding the 
Failures of Market Discipline, 92 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 1421, 1424 n.7 (2015) [hereinafter Min, 
Market Discipline] (explaining some of the different ways in which the term “bank” is defined). In 
the United States, the term “bank” (sometimes also called a “commercial bank” or “traditional 
bank” to distinguish it from investment banking) has often been used in its legal sense to describe 
federally insured depository institutions with bank charters (or similar types of charters such as 
thrift or credit union charters). See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (2018) (defining bank). The term “bank” is 
also used in an economic sense to describe financial intermediaries (including chartered depository 
institutions) that rely on short-term funding (such as demand depositors) to fund long-term 
investments in loans and other credit instruments. See Min, Market Discipline, supra, at 1424 n.7 
(summarizing the institutions that are considered banks). The distinction between the legal and 
economic definitions of the term “bank” has sharpened with the rise of “shadow banking,” which 
serves the same credit intermediation functions as traditional banking, but outside of the legal 
framework that governs the insured depository institutions that have historically been understood 
to be “banks.” Id. at 1449–52. In this Article, I generally use the term “bank” in a narrower sense 
to include only insured depository institutions. By contrast, I generally use the term “leveraged 
financial company” or “LFC” to refer to the broader universe of institutions that serve bank-like 
functions, including both traditional banks and also other institutions such as financial holding 
companies, bank holding companies and non-bank financial firms (such as investment banks or 
money market funds) that rely heavily on short-term funding to finance their investments in credit 
instruments. 
2. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT 
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN 
THE UNITED STATES, at xvii–xix (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT]. 
3. The recent financial crisis was estimated to have cost the United States as much as $14 
trillion. See Tyler Atkinson et al., How Bad Was It? The Costs and Consequences of the 2007–09 
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so much risk? The regulatory response to the financial crisis has to date 
been almost entirely focused on the prudential regulation of financial 
institutions, with a particular emphasis on so-called “systemically 
important financial institutions” (SIFIs).4 But despite a broad consensus 
that the incentives of these institutions—and their directors and 
officers—played a major role in causing the financial crisis, regulatory 
reform efforts have not featured comprehensive changes to these 
governance incentives. To the extent that post-crisis governance changes 
have been implemented for financial institutions, they have been minor 
in scope and generally emphasized greater accountability to shareholders, 
reflecting the corporate governance literature’s longstanding focus on 
reducing shareholder agency costs. 
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 provides a very good example of this 
phenomenon.5 Dodd-Frank makes a number of important changes to the 
prudential regulation of LFCs, particularly for SIFIs, which now face new 
consolidated capital and examination requirements6 and a newly created 
resolution regime called the Orderly Liquidation Authority.7 Dodd-Frank 
also mandates new mortgage origination and securitization standards for 
banks and other financial institutions,8 and creates a Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau to promulgate and enforce consumer protection rules 
relating to bank loans and other financial products.9 Notably, almost all 
of these changes take the form of external regulatory measures that must 
be monitored and enforced by outside regulators. But Dodd-Frank barely 
touches the issue of the internal governance of LFCs. And as I describe 
in greater detail in Part II.A, the handful of governance changes created 
 
Financial Crisis, FED. RES. BANK DALL.: STAFF PAPERS, no. 20, July 2013, at 1–2 (summarizing 
the costs of the financial crisis). As Reinhart & Rogoff, among others, have observed, similarly 
large costs have always resulted from financial crises. See generally CARMEN M. REINHART & 
KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009). 
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2018)), created a new regulatory 
regime for bank holding companies with more than $250 billion in assets and certain nonbank 
financial companies identified as posing risks to the financial stability of the United States. Id. 
§§ 113, 115 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5323, 5325 (2018)). Dodd-Frank established a 
new Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), responsible for overseeing bank holding 
companies with total assets over $250 billion and non-bank financial companies that it has 
designated as being systemically risky. Id. §§ 111–116 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321–
5326 (2018)). Dodd-Frank also provided the Federal Reserve with significant regulatory authority 
over these systemically important financial institutions as well as all bank holding companies with 
more than $50 billion in assets. Id. §§ 161–171 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5361–5371 
(2018)). 
5. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
6. Id. §§ 161–176 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5361–5374 (2018)). 
7. Id. §§ 201–217 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–5394 (2018)). 
8. Id. §§ 941–946, 1400–1506 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2018). 
9. Id. §§ 1001–1109 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481–5603 (2018)). 
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by Dodd-Frank are all designed to more closely align the incentives of 
directors and officers with the interests of shareholders, which potentially 
exacerbates the misalignment between the objectives of banking decision 
makers and the goals of regulators. 
The lack of attention paid to bank governance is an enormous failure 
on the part of regulators. After all, under most accounts, the 2007–08 
financial crisis was the result of deliberate decisions made by LFC 
directors and officers—often encouraged by strong shareholder 
pressure—to take on greater risk.10 To increase shareholder returns, 
financial firms added enormous amounts of leverage—the ratio of debt 
to equity (or other forms of regulatory capital)—such that by the end of 
2007, Citigroup had an effective leverage ratio of 48:1, Goldman Sachs 
had a leverage ratio of 32:1, and Morgan Stanley and Lehman Brothers 
had leverage ratios of 40:1.11 
LFCs took on risk in many other ways. For example, as the FCIC 
documents, beginning in 2003 and continuing up through the financial 
crisis, Merrill Lynch’s senior executives made the decision to plunge 
heavily into the high-margin, high-risk collateralized debt obligation 
(CDO) market.12 Between 2002 and 2004, Merrill’s market share of the 
CDO underwriting business grew from fifteenth to second, and by 2006, 
Merrill led the market.13 
In July 2007, Chuck Prince, then the CEO of Citigroup, in asserting 
that his company would continue to play a significant role in subprime 
mortgage securitization despite growing concerns about the risks 
associated with these activities, famously stated: “When the music stops, 
in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music 
is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”14 This 
comment was widely understood as an acknowledgement of the strong 
market pressures to take risks, even in the face of strong indications that 
those risks could potentially lead to high losses, as they eventually ended 
up doing.15 
 
10. See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 18–21. 
11. Id. at 65. 
12. Id. at 202–04. 
13. Id. 
14. Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buy-Outs, FIN. 
TIMES (July 9, 2007), https://www.ft.com/content/80e2987a-2e50-11dc-821c-0000779fd2ac 
[https://perma.cc/BUV4-MBTS]. 
15. See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 175 (noting that in a follow-up interview with the 
FCIC staff, Prince clarified this comment by explaining that “banks individually had no credibility 
to stop participating in this lending business” and “[i]t was not credible for one institution to 
unilaterally back away from this leveraged lending business”); Ing-Haw Cheng et al., Yesterday’s 
Heroes: Compensation and Creative Risk-Taking 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
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As I argue in Part II of this Article, many of the problems with banking 
governance arise from the preoccupation, among both policy leaders and 
firm officers and directors alike, with serving the interests of 
shareholders. The corporate governance literature has long been 
preoccupied with the problem of reducing shareholder agency costs. But 
this emphasis on shareholder interests is not appropriate for governance 
in banks and other LFCs, for three reasons. First, LFCs are much more 
heavily leveraged than other types of firms, and so the interests of their 
equity investors are both more misaligned with those of other 
stakeholders and also less important from a policy perspective. Second, 
because the debt issued by LFCs is typically guaranteed, either explicitly 
as with deposit insurance or implicitly as with “too big to fail” backstops, 
there is a direct taxpayer interest in reducing the risk of LFCs. Finally, 
LFCs have steep negative external costs arising from their failures, which 
creates a strong public policy rationale for ensuring the safety and 
soundness of these institutions. These distinctions provide a strong 
justification for revising banking governance norms to emphasize safety 
and soundness over shareholder wealth maximization. Indeed, it is no 
small thing that the regulation of banking—which is generally 
acknowledged as extremely comprehensive and burdensome16—is 
almost entirely preoccupied with safety and soundness.17 
Our experience with LFC governance in the period leading up to the 
financial crisis provides an apt example of exactly this point. During the 
2003-07 period, financial firms that took on higher risk were rewarded 
with higher share prices, while firms that had more conservative risk 
management practices were penalized by stock markets.18 Conversely, 
bank executives who tried to limit risk-taking were often punished for 
their actions. As the FCIC describes, two senior executives at Lehman 
 
Paper No. 16176, 2010) (“[The Prince] quote is often attributed as market pressure (presumably 
being fired by impatient shareholders) forcing Citi’s managers to take on such risks, whether or not 
they fully understood them.”). 
16. See, e.g., Kathryn Reed Edge, Obama Administration Proposal to Rebuild Financial 
Supervision and Regulation, 45 TENN. B.J. 26, 26 (2009) (“Most bankers and their lawyers believe 
that depository institutions are already among the most highly regulated companies in the United 
States economy”). 
17. See Alan M. White, Banks as Utilities, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1241, 1259–67 (2016) (arguing that 
the singular focus of United States banking regulation throughout its history has been ensuring the 
safety and soundness of financial institutions); id. at 1267 (“Banking legislation and bank 
regulatory agencies have served primarily to protect the safety and reliability of banks’ most basic 
deposit and payment functions.”). 
18. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL 
BANKING CRISIS 46 (2009) (concluding that bank share prices “delivered strong market price 
reinforcement to management’s convictions that their aggressive growth strategies were value 
creative”). See also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder 
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 717–23 (2010) (explaining that risky choices resulted in 
high rewards for many financial firms). 
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Brothers, the head of Lehman’s fixed income group and the chief risk 
officer, “warned against taking on too much risk in the face of growing 
pressure to compete aggressively against other investment banks.” One 
left the firm shortly thereafter based on “philosophical differences,” and 
the other was demoted to a policy position working with government 
regulators.19 In a similar example, Citi’s chief underwriter, concerned 
that Citi was taking on too much risk and “join[ing] the other lemmings 
headed for the cliff,” made a series of sharp warnings, including to Citi’s 
Chairman and other top executives, expressing his concern that Citi was 
facing billions of dollars in losses from poorly underwritten loans. After 
he made these warnings, he was transferred to a new position, was 
downgraded in his performance review, saw a bonus reduction, and went 
from supervising 220 employees to supervising only 2.20 
Those banks that stayed out of the high-risk, high-return activities that 
led to the financial crisis did so despite strong pressure from shareholders. 
Wells Fargo was one prominent example of a firm that stayed away from 
subprime mortgages and other risky loan products during the 2002–07 
period, even as most of its peers entered into these markets. John Stumpf, 
the CEO of Wells Fargo, stated “[These were] hard decisions to make at 
the time . . . we did lose revenue, and we did lose volume.”21 Toronto 
Dominion Bank (TD Bank) had a similar experience in 2006, when it 
decided at the behest of its CEO Edmund Clark that it would cease its 
activities in structured financial products. Clark, who justified this move 
by saying that he didn’t understand the business and was concerned about 
the potential for serious losses, recalled that stock analysts at the time 
wrote that he was an “idiot” for exiting the structured products 
marketplace.22 
But assuming we accept the idea that shareholder interests should be 
deemphasized in LFC governance, how might we go about reforming this 
area? In Part III, I argue for the creation of federal standards requiring 
directors and officers to prioritize safety and soundness over the interests 
of shareholders. Federalizing banking governance would be the most 
efficient pathway to realigning the internal incentives of banking 
institutions and is consistent with the long history of banking regulation 
in our country. The bifurcation of substantive regulation and 
 
19. FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 18–19. 
20. Id. at 19. 
21. Id. at 108. 
22. See Ed Clark, President and CEO, Toronto Dominion Bank Financial Group, Presentation 
at the National Bank 2010 Financial Series Conference (Mar. 30, 2010) (presenting TD Bank’s 
focus on “continuous improvement” after the economic crisis); see also THOMAS H. STANTON, 
WHY SOME FIRMS THRIVE WHILE OTHERS FAIL: GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT LESSONS 
FROM THE CRISIS 52–54 (2012). 
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organizational law in banking is a historical accident and not the product 
of any coherent or intentional policy rationale. 
As I describe, the federalization of banking governance could be 
implemented in several ways. Federal regulators already have significant 
and expansive authorities over a wide array of banking and financial 
institutions. These powers could be utilized to encourage banking firms 
to adopt safety and soundness duties through a variety of mechanisms, 
including by negotiating covenants or reincorporating as benefit 
corporations. Alternatively, Congress could pass laws creating a new 
federal regime for banking governance. Finally, Congress could create a 
new banking charter for all institutions that engage in the economic 
activities of banking—and thus pose the same economic and financial 
systemic risks as banks. 
In Part III, I also articulate the broad outlines of what a federal duty of 
safety and soundness should look like. First, it should prioritize safety 
and soundness over shareholder wealth maximization. Second, it should 
encompass not only the directors and officers of chartered banks but also 
of other leveraged financial companies, including bank holding 
companies and systemically important non-bank firms at a bare 
minimum. Finally, a breach of this duty should allow for a private right 
of action by the firm’s creditors. 
It should be noted that this article is focused on the question of who 
should be owed a fiduciary duty by the directors and officers of banking 
firms but does not address what the appropriate standard for this duty 
should be. Whether and to what extent the duty of care and duty of loyalty 
should be adjusted are important questions, and ones I intend to address 
in a subsequent paper. 
Legislators and regulators have exerted enormous amounts of energy 
trying to improve financial stability through external restrictions and 
regulatory oversight on the risks taken by leveraged financial firms, even 
as the internal incentives of these firms have encouraged greater risk-
taking. It is long past time that we addressed the misaligned incentives of 
these firms by reforming banking governance. 
I.  THE LAW OF BANK GOVERNANCE 
In the aftermath of the 2007–08 financial crisis, the primary focus of 
financial regulators and policy makers has been the unique 
macroprudential risks posed by “shadow banking.” Naturally, much of 
the post-crisis regulatory reform agenda has involved adapting existing 
prudential regulatory approaches to reduce the systemic risk posed by 
shadow banks and other financial institutions that play a large role in the 
global shadow banking system. These reforms have included revising 
capital requirements to better reflect systemic risk, adopting new liquidity 
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requirements to limit run risk, and creating new measures to identify and 
address new sources of systemic risk. 
However, while traditional prudential regulations have been the 
primary focus of financial regulators and policy makers, there has been a 
nascent but growing movement arguing for reforms of the governance of 
financial institutions, so as to reduce the incentives of directors and 
officers to take on greater risk. Most banking today—either shadow 
banking or traditional banking—takes place under the aegis of a corporate 
organizational form, and so this governance discussion has been 
grounded in a corporate law paradigm. But as I describe in greater detail 
in this Part, the preeminence of corporate law for banking is a relatively 
new phenomenon. For most of our country’s history, only financial 
institutions with a national or state bank charter—distinct from a 
corporate charter—were allowed to engage in the business of banking. 
And as I discuss below, there are some subtle but important differences 
between the historical legal development of bank governance and 
corporate governance that are relevant for thinking about how to reform 
bank governance today. 
A.  Background 
In the United States, bank charters are distinct from general 
incorporation charters, although they share many common features. In 
order to become a “bank”—which is defined by statute as any entity that 
is allowed to accept deposits and is engaged in the business of making 
commercial loans—the organizers of the business entity must first 
receive a bank charter either from the United States, one of the fifty states 
or the District of Columbia, or one of the US territories.23 As with 
corporate charters, bank charters create business entities with the powers 
to adopt and use a corporate seal; to make contracts; to sue and be sued 
in a court of law; to elect or appoint directors who have the power to 
appoint officers; to create bylaws regulating the affairs of the bank, its 
directors and its general business; and to exist indefinitely.24 But a bank 
charter is unique in that it also allows its recipient to engage in the 
“business of banking,” providing it with special bank powers that are not 
available to other types of business entities. These include “discounting 
and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other 
 
23. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (2018) (defining “bank” as an insured institution organized 
under US laws that demands deposits and issues loans). I use the term “bank charter” expansively 
to encompass other depository institutions with equivalent powers and regulatory oversight, such 
as thrifts, credit unions, industrial loan companies, and community development financial 
institutions. 
24. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2018) (outlining the general corporate powers of national chartered 
banks). 
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evidences of debt,” “receiving deposits,” “buying and selling exchange, 
coin and bullion,” and “loaning money on personal security,” as well as 
“all such incidental powers as shall be necessary” to carry on this business 
of banking.25 
While banks and general business corporations today have distinct 
charters, these charters share the same origins. The first business 
corporations were introduced to the American colonies in the seventeenth 
century.26 These early corporations were created by legislative statute to 
serve a specific public purpose, such as constructing a bridge or operating 
a ferry.27 To facilitate capital formation, corporate charters came with a 
number of important privileges, including limited liability for 
shareholders and a state-granted monopoly or oligopoly over the business 
activity to be performed.28 In return, the state would receive the benefits 
of the public good being performed and often some form of additional 
fees or profit sharing.29 Because of the unique public-private nature of 
the early American corporation, corporate business charters were rare in 
this era.30 Only seven business corporations were created in America 
during the colonial period, with another 181 being formed between 1796 
and 1800.31 
Bank charters were originally granted as a type of corporate charter, 
given to further the important public purpose of providing banking 
services to their communities. Like other corporate charters of the time, 
bank charters gave their recipients a monopoly franchise to conduct a 
specific activity—in this case banking—as well as limited liability for 
their shareholders.32 The first bank charters issued in the American 
 
25. Id. (Seventh). 
26. See Simeon E. Baldwin, American Business Corporations Before 1789, 8 AMER. HIST. REV. 
449, 450–51 (1903). 
27. See Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 
1633–34. 
28. Id. at 1634–35. See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 131–
32 (3d ed. 2005) (“The corporation was, originally a kind of monopoly. . . . [I]t tended to vest 
exclusive control over a public asset, a natural resource, or a business opportunity in one group of 
favorites or investors.”). 
29. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 132. See also Richard Sylla, How the American 
Corporation Evolved, 158 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 354, 357–58 (2014) (describing examples of 
states requiring their corporations to direct some of their profits or business efforts to public 
purposes). 
30. FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 129. While the business corporation was rare during this 
period, corporate charters were granted more frequently for churches, charities, or cities or 
boroughs. Id. 
31. See id. at 129–30 (“There were only seven in the whole colonial period; another 181 were 
granted between 1796 and 1800.” (footnote omitted)). 
32. See Richard Sylla, Early American Banking: The Significance of the Corporate Form, 14 
BUS. & ECON. HIST. 105, 110 (1985) [hereinafter Sylla, Early American Banking] (citing Joseph 
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colonies were for “land banks” that issued paper notes—“bills on loan”—
to borrowers who put up their land as collateral—essentially a form of 
mortgage for real estate improvements.33 Interestingly, and in marked 
contrast to the European banks of the time, which were structured as 
partnerships, the first American banks were organized as corporations.34 
During the colonial era and early years of the Republic, charters for banks 
and other business corporations were rare and typically given only to the 
privileged or politically well connected. 
Over time, and particularly beginning with the “Free Banking” era that 
followed the demise of the Second National Bank of the United States in 
1836, the states began to liberalize the availability of charters for both 
banks and general business corporations.35 In 1811, New York State 
passed a statute allowing any association of persons who met certain 
requirements to receive a charter of incorporation for manufacturing—
the first general incorporation statute of its kind.36 In 1838, New York 
enacted the Free Banking Law, which similarly opened up the granting 
of bank charters to “any person or association of persons” which were 
able to satisfy certain minimum capitalization requirements.37 Other 
states followed suit. General business incorporation statutes, which 
allowed anyone meeting the statutory requirements to receive a corporate 
charter for a particular line of business such as manufacturing, insurance, 
or banking, were adopted by most of the states by the late 1850s.38 During 
this period, states had exclusive jurisprudence over the chartering of both 
corporations and banks. 
While the legal frameworks for banks and corporations have diverged 
over time, the shared origins of bank charters and corporate charters mean 
that the laws applying to the internal workings of these different types of 
firms are similar in many ways. As described below, banks and 
 
Stancliffe Davis, Colonial Corporations Chartered in England, in JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, 
ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATION, at ch. 2 (1917)) (explaining that 
charters were designed as monopolies). See also Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, 
“Special,” Vestigial, or Visionary? What Bank Regulation Tells Us About the Corporation—and 
Vice Versa, 39 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 453, 469–70 (2016). 
33. See Owen F. Humpage, Paper Money and Inflation in Colonial America, ECON. COMMENT., 
no. 2015–06, May 13, 2015, at 2 (documenting the history of bank notes). See also Theodore 
Thayer, The Land-Bank System in the American Colonies, 13 J. ECON. HIST. 145, 145 (1953). 
34. Sylla, Early American Banking, supra note 32, at 113–14. 
35. See generally id. 
36. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 134–35. 
37. See Sylla, Early American Banking, supra note 32, at 107. 
38. FRIEDMAN supra note 28, at 135; Gerald P. Dwyer, Jr., Wildcat Banking, Banking Panics, 
and Free Banking in the United States, FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV., Dec. 1996, at 2–4. 
See also Sylla, Early American Banking, supra note 32, at 107 (“The modern concept of the 
corporation took shape in the early nineteenth-century United States in the movement for free 
banking.”). 
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corporations today have similar limited shareholder liability and 
fiduciary duty rules, and state common law treats banks and corporations 
fairly similarly. But there are some important differences between banks 
and corporations, deriving from their divergent historical development, 
which may provide an important foundation for thinking about how to 
reform the governance of financial institutions. 
B.  Limited Liability for Bank Shareholders 
While bank shareholders today enjoy roughly the same limited liability 
as corporate shareholders, this was not always the case. Until the Civil 
War, bank and corporate charters were primarily issued by states,39 and 
the common law rule for shareholders of both types of entities was that 
they were not personally liable for the firm’s debts.40 However, during 
the early part of the nineteenth century, a small but growing number of 
states enacted laws subjecting bank shareholders to “double par liability,” 
such that in the event of the bank’s insolvency, shareholders were 
personally liable for an amount equal to the par value of their shares (in 
addition to the actual value they paid for the shares themselves).41 Double 
par liability saw a surge in adoption following Congress’s passage of the 
National Bank Act of 1863 (NBA),42 which created a system of 
nationally chartered banks and put in place the so-called “dual banking” 
system of national and state chartered banks operating side by side.43 The 
NBA adopted the then-minority rule of double par liability for all 
 
39. See Christine E. Blair & Rose M. Kushmeider, Challenges to the Dual Banking System: The 
Funding of Bank Supervision, 18 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 2 (2006) (“Aside from the short-lived 
exceptions of the First Bank of the United States and the Second Bank of the United States, bank 
chartering was solely a function of the states until 1863.”). Two early and notable exceptions to this 
were the First and Second Banks of the United States, which were Congressionally chartered 
corporations authorized to conduct banking activities. See JOHN THOM HOLDSWORTH & DAVIS R. 
DEWEY, NAT’L MONETARY COMM’N, THE FIRST AND SECOND BANKS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. 
DOC. NO. 571, at 19–22, 149–57 (2d Sess. 1910). 
40. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: 
History and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 35–36 (1992) (first citing Pollard v. Bailey, 
87 U.S. 520, 526 (1874); and then citing Sumner v. Marcy, 23 F. Cas. 384 (C.C.D. Me. 1847) (No. 
13,609)). 
41. Id. at 36–37. 
42. National Currency Act, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863) (repealed 1864). The National Currency 
Act was repealed and replaced the following year by similar legislation that aimed to improve upon 
the original legislation. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 and 31 U.S.C. (2018)). Although neither bill was actually titled the “National Bank 
Act,” they have collectively become known as such (or sometimes the “National Banking Act”). 
See Howard H. Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REV. 565, 572 (1966). 
43. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking 
System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 681–82 (1988). As Geoffrey Miller has argued, the national 
banking system created by the National Bank Act was intended to provide a stable currency and to 
displace state banks, and certainly not to create the dual banking system that emerged. Geoffrey P. 
Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1987). 
2020] Federalizing Bank Governance 845 
shareholders of national banks.44 This quickly led to a mass adoption of 
the rule by the states. By 1931, double par liability had been implemented 
by all of the states except Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and 
Virginia.45 
Following the banking panic of 1929–33, double par liability for bank 
shareholders was widely seen as a failure.46 Congress consequently 
repealed double liability for all newly issued national bank shares in 
1933,47 and allowed banks to opt out of double liability for any 
outstanding shares in 1935.48 By the 1950s, there were only a handful of 
banks left that still maintained double par liability for their shareholders, 
and Congress formally eliminated double liability for these banks in 
1953.49 The elimination of double par liability for national banks was 
paralleled by a similar movement across state legislatures. By 1944, 
thirty-one states had abolished double par liability for banks, and today, 
double liability for bank shareholders does not exist.50 Since the 1950s, 
then, bank and corporate shareholders have enjoyed equivalent limited 
liability. 
C.  Fiduciary Duties of Bank Directors 
Just as the laws governing shareholder liability for banks and 
corporations have converged over time, so too have the laws governing 
the fiduciary duties of bank and corporate directors.51 While there is a 
robust literature—both theoretical and empirical—that has emerged 
discussing the fiduciary duties of corporations, banking governance has 
been far less studied. To the extent that banking governance issues have 
received scholarly attention, these have tended to revolve around two 
discrete areas: first, what the duty should look like; and second, to whom 
 
44. National Currency Act § 12, 12 Stat. at 668 (stating that “each shareholder shall be liable to 
the amount of the par value of the shares held by him, in addition to the amount invested in such 
shares”). 
45. See Macey & Miller, supra note 40, at 37 (citing E.G.T., Jr., Note, Ambit of Double Liability 
of National Bank Stockholders, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 1133, 1133 n.1 (1932)). Several states had 
important substantive distinctions in their liability rules. For example, California’s law had no 
express limitation on shareholder liability, see CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 3 (repealed 1930), and 
Colorado imposed triple liability, see COLO. STAT. ANN. ch. 18, § 50 (1935) (repealed 1935). 
46. See Macey & Miller, supra note 40, at 37–38. 
47. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 22, 48 Stat. 162, 189 (repealed 1959). 
48. Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, § 304, 49 Stat. 684, 708 (repealed 1959). 
49. See Macey & Miller, supra note 40, at 38–39 (citing Act of May 18, 1953, ch. 59 § 2, 67 
Stat. 27). 
50. Id. at 39 (citing Perry L. Greenwood, Note, Banks—Liability of Stockholders of Holding 
Company on National Bank Stock Held by Company, 7 U. DET. L.J. 123, 125 (1944)). 
51. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 247, 298 (1999). Directors are also under a duty to act lawfully. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 945, 945 (1990). 
846 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  51 
the duty should be owed.52 This paper addresses the second area, 
although I intend to make a separate set of arguments around the first area 
in a future article.53 Generally, the law of fiduciary duties has developed 
in parallel for banks and corporations.54 But there are important, if at 
times subtle, differences between banks and general business 
corporations in who is owed a fiduciary duty, as I describe in this section. 
1.  Who Is Owed a Fiduciary Duty? 
In corporate law, the claim that directors owe a duty of shareholder 
wealth maximization is well established and also the subject of great 
criticism. Shareholder wealth maximization has been seen as a central 
part of corporate law since Dodge v. Ford was handed down in 1919.55 
In that case, the Michigan Supreme Court famously stated: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be 
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in 
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change 
in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the non-distribution of 
profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.56 
This dicta has become a mainstay in corporate law, representing the 
maxim that officers and directors owe a duty to shareholders to maximize 
their profits.57 While there has long been criticism of this view,58 most 
 
52. Lawrence G. Baxter, Fiduciary Issues in Federal Banking Regulation, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 7, 13 (1993). 
53. Generally speaking, as I describe in a forthcoming article, the duties of care and loyalty in 
banking have long tracked those same fiduciary duties in corporate law. But as Frank Partnoy has 
argued, the Delaware courts have established a duty of oversight (part of the duty of loyalty) for 
corporate directors with the Caremark decision, In re Caremark Int’l, Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. 
Ch. 1996), which can potentially be interpreted as requiring a heightened standard of care for the 
directors of institutions with unique risks, such as financial firms. See generally Frank Partnoy, 
Delaware and Financial Risk, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW 
KEEPING UP?, at ch. 6 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall Stuart Thomas eds., 2019). 
54. Partnoy, supra note 53. 
55. See generally Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
56. Id. at 684. 
57. See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 678 (1986) (citing Dodge v. Ford to 
establish that corporate law requires the maximization of shareholder profits); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. 
BUS. & TECH. L. 335, 337–38 (“The law’s basic position . . . famously was articulated in Dodge v. 
Ford Motor Co.”). 
58. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate Law, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 87, 88 
(2005) (“[S]hareholders are not owners in any traditional sense of ownership. They are not owners 
in any other meaningful way either . . . .”); Blair & Stout, supra note 51 (proposing an alternative 
“team production” paradigm of the corporation and arguing that this model illustrates the normative 
and descriptive flaws with shareholder wealth maximization); Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as 
Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409, 
1411–19 (1993) (arguing that corporate law should and does allow for a multi-fiduciary approach 
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who study and practice corporate law believe that a duty of shareholder 
wealth maximization is well established as a matter of law.59 For 
example, the prominent corporate law professors Henry Hansmann and 
Reinier Kraakman have stated that “[t]here is no longer any serious 
competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to 
increase long-term shareholder value.”60 The American Law Institute has 
said that corporations should be managed “with a view to enhancing 
corporate profit and shareholder gain.”61 The current Chief Justice of the 
highly influential Delaware Supreme Court, Leo E. Strine, Jr., has 
repeatedly and forcefully asserted in several influential law review 
articles that Delaware corporate law clearly imposes a duty on directors 
to maximize shareholder profits.62 Indeed, as Chief Justice Strine has 
 
to managerial responsibilities); see generally E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate 
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1155–56 (1932). 
59. See infra notes 60–73 and accompanying text. But see generally Lynn A. Stout, Why We 
Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163 (2008) (arguing that corporate law 
does not necessarily require officers and directors to maximize shareholder wealth). A potential 
caveat to the rule that directors owe a fiduciary duty to the long-term interests of shareholders lies 
in the so-called “zone of insolvency.” In Credit Lyonnais, the Delaware Chancery Court stated: 
At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, the board of 
directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers [i.e. shareholders], but owes 
its duty to the corporate enterprise . . . in managing the business affairs of a solvent 
corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right (both 
the efficient and fair) course to follow for the corporation may diverge for the choice 
that the stockholders (or the creditors, or the employees, or any single group interested 
in the corporation) would make if given the opportunity to act. 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 
277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). However, a line of subsequent decisions by Delaware 
courts have seemingly narrowed, or perhaps even eliminated, the zone of insolvency concept. See 
Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004); Trenwick Am. Litig. Tr. 
v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006); N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming 
Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007). 
60. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 439, 439 (2001). 
61. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 2.01(a) (1994). As J. Haskell Murray describes, this language reflects a compromise with those 
who are opposed to the principle of shareholder wealth maximization, as the language itself 
describes “enhancing” rather than “maximizing” corporate profits and shareholder gains. 
Furthermore, § 2.01(b), states that the corporation may take into account reasonable ethical 
considerations and may devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, 
educational, and philanthropic purposes. See J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social 
Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 7 n.22 
(2012). 
62. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding 
of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 
50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 763–68, 785–86 (2015) [hereinafter Strine, The Dangers of Denial] 
(arguing that the power structure of the corporation—including the exclusive rights of shareholders 
to vote and to sue under the Delaware General Corporation Law or for breaches of fiduciary 
duties—makes clear that directors are required to maximize long-term shareholder value); Leo E. 
 
848 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  51 
pointed out, “[i]n the corporate republic, no constituency other than 
stockholders is given any power.”63 Shareholders have several rights 
unique to them that give them some control over the powers of the 
corporation, including the right to elect corporate directors,64 approve 
certificate amendments65 and significant changes such as mergers66 or 
major asset sales,67 amend the bylaws,68 and to sue directors for 
breaching their fiduciary duties to shareholders.69 
In support of this claim that shareholders are owed a duty of wealth 
maximization are a number of prominent Delaware cases, including Katz 
v. Oak Industries,70 Revlon v. MacAndrews,71 TW Services v. SW 
Acquisition,72 and eBay v. Newmark.73 While Delaware law obviously 
 
Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 151–55 (2012) (“[C]orporate law requires directors, as a matter of 
their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders.”); 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared 
Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. 
L. 1, 3 (2007) (stating that while it may be fair to describe corporations as “social institutions,” it 
must still be recognized that they must be run with “the ultimate goal of producing profits for 
stockholders”). 
63. Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 62, at 766. 
64. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2020). 
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1)–(2) (2020). 
66. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2020). 
67. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (2020). 
68. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2020). 
69. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2020). 
70. Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“It is the obligation of directors 
to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the corporation’s 
stockholders . . . .”). 
71. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 177–82 (Del. 1986) 
(“A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided 
there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders. However, such concern for non-
stockholder interests is inappropriate when . . . the object no longer is to protect or maintain the 
corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.”). 
72. TW Services Inc. v. SW Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *7 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (“[D]irectors may be said to owe a duty to shareholders as a class to manage the 
corporation within the law, with due care and in a way intended to maximize the long run interests 
of shareholders. There is a time, however, when the board’s duty becomes more targeted and 
specific and its range of options become narrower. In [Revlon], the Supreme Court held that the 
board’s duty was a single one: to exercise its judgment in an effort to secure the highest price 
available . . . .”). 
73. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (rejecting a 
corporate policy approved by the founders of Craigslist, who owned a majority of the voting shares, 
that would have expressly not allowed for profit maximization, and stating that “[h]aving chosen a 
for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards 
that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation 
for the benefit of its stockholders. The “Inc.” after the company name has to mean at least that.”). 
See also CLARK, supra note 57, at 682 (aside from “a possible exception or two . . . courts have not 
retreated from the assumption that the primary or residual purpose of a business corporation is to 
make profits for its shareholders”). 
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does not bind the courts of other states, it is disproportionately influential 
given both the tremendous number (and aggregate asset size) of 
companies choosing to incorporate in Delaware and the high degree of 
deference given by other states to the expertise of Delaware courts in 
dealing with corporate law matters. 
It may be relatively clear that corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty 
to maximize shareholder wealth (although it is more controversial 
whether they should owe such a duty),74 but this is less settled for bank 
directors. It is generally uncontested that bank directors owe a fiduciary 
duty to the bank’s shareholders, but many observers have argued that 
bank fiduciary duties are broader, with bank directors also owing a 
general fiduciary duty to depositors, to the federal government, and/or to 
the general principle of safety and soundness. 
This disagreement over the scope of bank fiduciary duties is largely 
due to the historical development of banking law. Following the collapse 
of the Second Bank of the United States of America and the subsequent 
“Free Banking Era,” and continuing through much of the nineteenth 
century, bank fiduciary duties were considered purely a matter of state 
common law. Consequently, they mostly developed in parallel with 
corporate fiduciary duties, with a high deference to board autonomy and 
an increasing emphasis on maximizing shareholder profits.75 As Patricia 
McCoy has documented, during this period, bank directors were given 
very broad latitude to pursue shareholders’ interests, with a robust 
business judgment rule and effectively no judicial enforcement against 
excessive risk-taking by bank managers and directors.76 Reflecting the 
mores of the era, bank depositors were generally denied standing to sue 
for a breach of fiduciary duty, as it was assumed that their relationship 
with the bank was a contractual one and did not extend to the bank’s 
 
74. For example, Senator Elizabeth Warren recently sponsored the Accountable Capitalism Act, 
which would require all business corporations with more than $1 billion in annual revenues to 
receive a newly created federal corporate charter. This charter would specifically require that 
corporate directors consider the interests of all of the corporation’s stakeholders, not just its 
shareholders, and that at least 40 percent of its directors be made up of representatives from labor. 
Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, Warren Introduces Accountable Capitalism Act: Comprehensive 
Legislation to Eliminate Skewed Market Incentives and Return to the Era When American 
Corporations and American Workers Did Well Together (Aug. 15, 2018), available at 
https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-introduces-accountable-
capitalism-act [https://perma.cc/B7JV-3H8L]. 
75. See Patricia A. McCoy, A Political Economy of the Business Judgment Rule in Banking: 
Implication for Corporate Law, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 22–25 (1996) (discussing the historical 
development of bank fiduciary duties). 
76. Id. at 22–30. 
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officers and directors.77 Shareholder wealth maximization was seen as 
the primary goal of bank directors, even at the expense of depositors.78 
But this period was also marked by an epidemic of bank panics. By 
1891, the United States had experienced at least twelve different panics 
with their accompanying ruinous effects on economic growth and capital 
formation.79 Perhaps reflecting second thoughts on the laissez-faire 
model of banking, judicial attitudes towards bank governance began to 
shift in the late nineteenth century. In an 1875 opinion addressing the 
extent to which state usury laws could apply to nationally chartered 
banks, the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected the notion that 
banks were purely private enterprises, describing them rather as 
“instruments designed to be used to aid the government in the 
administration of an important branch of the public service.”80 Similarly, 
in a 1911 opinion, the Kansas Supreme Court, in upholding the state 
charter board’s decision to refuse a bank charter to a group of applicants 
based on a determination that there was no community need for another 
bank, stated that banking was not “a matter of private concern only” but 
rather, “for all purposes of legislative regulation and control it may be 
said to be ‘affected with a public interest.’”81 
Perhaps because of the view of banks as quasi-public enterprises, the 
courts were more open to the idea that bank stakeholders other than just 
shareholders might be owed a fiduciary duty. In the 1891 Briggs decision 
discussed above, Justice Harlan’s dissent explicitly takes into account the 
fiduciary interests owed to depositors as well as shareholders.82 Justice 
Harlan’s dissent was highly influential in subsequent cases in which 
 
77. Id. at 24–25 (first citing Union Nat’l Bank v. Hill, 49 S.W. 1012 (Mo. 1899); then citing 
Hart v. Evanson, 105 N.W. 942 (N.D. 1895); then citing Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 23 A. 405, 414–
15 (Pa. 1982); then citing Deadrick v. Bank of Commerce, 45 S.W. 786 (Tenn. 1898); and then 
citing Zinn v. Mendel, 9 W. Va. 580 (1876)). One notable exception to this common law antipathy 
to depositor standing came in the case of mutual savings banks, which did not have shareholders 
or directors, but rather were owned by the depositors and supervised by trustees who owed express 
fiduciary duties to the depositors. Id. at 30–33. In states where mutual savings banks were permitted 
by law, including New York, courts generally did confer standing on depositors and their 
representatives. Id. 
78. Id. at 25. 
79. Id. at 30. 
80. Farmers’ & Mechs.’ Nat’l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 33 (1875). 
81. Schaake v. Dolley, 118 P. 80, 83 (1911). 
82. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 166 (1891) (discussing the mismanagement of the bank 
in managing the money of the bank’s shareholders and depositors); id. at 171 (stating that “the 
abdication by directors of their duties and functions . . . puts in peril the interests of stockholders 
and depositors” (emphasis added)). Notably, the majority opinion in Briggs does not take a 
shareholder primacy position, but rather states instead that bank fiduciary duties are owed “not to 
stockholder[s] nor to creditors, as such, but to the bank.” Id. at 149–50. 
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courts found a fiduciary duty owed to depositors83 or otherwise expanded 
bank director liability.84 Many lower courts and state courts adopted the 
view that bank directors owe a fiduciary duty not only to the bank’s 
shareholders but also to its depositors and creditors.85 Correspondingly, 
as discussed above, there was also a notable trend towards curtailing the 
business judgment rule for bank directors and officers during this period, 
effectively expanding the scope of liability.86 By the early twentieth 
century, there was a growing movement in the courts towards recognizing 
that the governance of banks was distinct from that of other types of 
business corporations, and that bank directors owed a duty to their 
depositors.87 
The common law of bank director liability was complicated by 
Congress’s banking reforms of the 1930s, including the establishment of 
federal deposit insurance and expansive resolution powers for the 
regulators administering this federal deposit insurance, such as the 
authority to act as the receiver or conservator of a failing or troubled 
 
83. See, e.g., Robinson v. Hall, 63 F. 222, 227 (4th Cir. 1894) (citing Justice Harlan’s dissent in 
reversing the lower court’s decision to sustain the demurrer of the defendants, who were national 
bank directors, against claims that they breached a fiduciary duty owed to depositors); Anderson v. 
Bundy, 171 S.E. 501, 507 (Va. 1933) (citing Justice Harlan’s dissent to support its holding that 
state bank directors “must exercise ordinary care and prudence in the protection of their 
depositors”). 
84. See, e.g., Dudley v. Hawkins, 239 F. 386, 389 (S.D. Ga. 1917) (citing Justice Harlan’s 
dissent to hold that national bank directors owe a duty of ordinary care); Bank of Commerce v. 
Goolsby, 129 Ark. 416 (Ark. 1917) (citing Justice Harlan’s dissent in support of its holding that 
Arkansas state bank directors owe a duty of ordinary care). 
85. See, e.g., United Soc’y of Shakers v. Underwood, 9 Bush 609, 616–18 (Ky. 1873) (holding 
that bank directors owe a fiduciary duty to the bank’s creditors and customers); Hun v. Cary, 82 
N.Y. 65, 74 (1880) (holding that the trustees of a savings bank who approved the building of a new 
bank headquarters despite being near insolvency were liable to the depositors because they had 
“invited depositors to confide to them their savings, and to intrust the safe-keeping and management 
of them to their skill and prudence”); Delano v. Gardner, 17 Ill. App. 531, 538 (1887) (holding that 
directors of a state commercial bank who ignored warnings that the bank’s officers were engaged 
in fraud were liable to the bank’s depositors under a standard of gross negligence); Marshall v. 
Farmers’ & Mechs.’ Sav. Bank, 8 S.E. 586, 590, 591 (Va. 1889) (“The directors of a bank are not 
trustees for the stockholders alone, but they owe an even earlier duty to the 
depositors. . . . [D]irectors of banks [hold a trustee relationship] with stockholders, depositors and 
creditors . . . .”); Solomon v. Bates, 24 S.E. 478, 480 (N.D. 1896) (holding that state bank directors 
were liable to depositors “for injuries resulting from gross negligence on their part”). 
86. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
87. See, e.g., Campbell v. Watson, 50 A. 120, 124 (N.J. 1901) (stating that depositors have “a 
right to rely upon the character of the directors and officers of the bank, and that they will . . . devote 
to its affairs the same diligent attention which ordinary, prudent, diligent men pay to their own 
affairs”); Gause v. Commonwealth Tr. Co., 89 N.E. 476, 482 (N.Y. 1909) (differentiating between 
general business corporations and banks and concluding that bank directors owe a higher duty of 
care than their counterparts in other business corporations because a bank invites depositors to 
“submit to it the possession and care of their money and property”). 
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bank.88 As a result of these reforms, bank losses shifted from depositors 
to the federal government, and investor suits against banks were mostly 
displaced by litigation initiated by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation (FSLIC)—and eventually the Resolution Trust Corporation, 
which was created by Congress to replace FSLIC and deal with the 
collapse of the savings and loan industry—or the federal agencies 
responsible for overseeing the resolution of failed depository 
institutions.89 At the same time, one important byproduct of this 
phenomenon was that these cases went from primarily being decided by 
state courts (which is still the case with corporate director liability cases) 
to being primarily decided by federal courts.90 
As the federal government displaced bank investors as the primary 
plaintiff—and bearer of losses—following bank failures, the courts 
became more willing to expand the liability of bank directors, and to find 
that these directors owed a fiduciary duty to depositors (or the federal 
deposit insurance funds that guaranteed them). For example, in a 
prominent New York case in 1934, the court noted the trend towards 
holding bank directors to a higher standard than other types of directors, 
and explained: 
The reason for the higher standard of diligence required of banking as 
compared with that of other corporations is obvious. While 
legalistically the relation between the bank and its depositors is that of 
debtor and creditor, practically the directors are charged with the trust 
responsibility to see that depositors’ funds are safely and providently 
invested.91 
In 1935, the US Supreme Court, in hearing a case in which state 
chartered building-and-loan associations92 sought to convert to federally 
chartered savings-and-loan institutions, described these institutions as 
“quasi public instruments” distinct from other types of business 
corporations, and owing a duty to protect the interests of not only their 
shareholders but also their creditors.93 Extending this logic to national 
 
88. McCoy, supra note 75, at 22–25; see also id. at 53 (“The vast majority of reported bank 
director negligence cases since 1945 has been brought by the [Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation], or its one-time sister agency, the Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”), either in 
their corporate capacities or as conservators or receivers.”). 
89. Id. at 52 n.175. 
90. Id. at 53 (“[T]he principal forum for bank director liability cases has shifted from state courts 
to federal courts . . . .”). 
91. Broderick v. Marcus, 152 Misc. 413, 418 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934). 
92. This is a type of depository institution with shareholders meant to encourage home mortgage 
lending, essentially the same as the more ubiquitous terms “savings and loan association” or “thrift 
institution.” 
93. Hopkins Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315, 336 (1935); see also id. at 340 
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banks, the Sixth Circuit made clear in a 1938 opinion that bank directors 
owe a common law fiduciary duty to depositors, saying: 
[T]he law requires and depositors have a right to expect that directors 
should retain and maintain a reasonable control and supervision over 
the affairs of the bank . . . [i]n the discharge of this duty the directors 
are required not only in the observance of their official oath but by 
common law to use ordinary diligence. . . . They must keep in mind that 
a national bank is not a private corporation in which stockholders alone 
are interested. It is a quasi governmental agency, and one of its 
principal purposes among others is to hold and safekeep the money of 
its depositors.94 
In a 1940 case called Litwin v. Allen,95 a New York court—describing 
the conventional wisdom of the time—stated that “[u]ndoubtedly, a 
director of a bank is held to stricter accountability than the director of an 
ordinary business corporation [because he or she] is entrusted with the 
funds of depositors. . . .”96 
But the trend towards recognizing bank fiduciary duties to depositors 
waned in the post-World War II era. As discussed below, the 
extraordinary stability of the banking industry following the New Deal 
era reforms meant that there was virtually no bank failure-related 
litigation for several decades. As a result, case law addressing the issue 
of bank director negligence essentially disappeared for several decades. 
It was only with the spate of bank failures beginning in the late 1970s and 
accelerating into the late 1980s and early 1990s that questions of bank 
fiduciary duties arose again. As courts began to revisit the issue of 
whether and to what extent bank depositors are owed fiduciary duties 
under state tort law, many reverted back to the old legal standards 
governing this issue and concluded that the bank-depositor relationship 
is a form of debtor-creditor relationship that does not give rise to any 
fiduciary obligations.97 Conversely, many other courts went the other 
 
(“In the creation of corporations of this quasi-public order . . . the state is parens patriae, acting in 
a spirit of benevolence for the welfare of its citizens. Shareholders and creditors have assumed a 
relation to the business in the belief that the assets will be protected by all the power of the 
government against use for other ends than those stated in the charter . . . . [T]here is thus the duty 
of the parens patriae to keep faith with those who have put their trust in the parental power 
[including creditors].”). 
94. Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 1938) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
95. Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940). 
96. Id. at 678 (citing Gause v. Commonwealth Tr. Co., 89 N.E. 476, 482 (N.Y. 1909)). 
97. See, e.g., Linden Place, LLC v. Stanley Bank, 167 P.3d 374, 379 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) 
(“[T]he general rule is that the relationship between a bank and its depositor is a debtor-creditor 
relationship, not a fiduciary relationship.”); Geiger v. Crestar Bank, 778 A.2d 1085, 1091 (D.C. 
2001) (quoting Miller v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi., 4 F.3d 518, 520 (7th Cir. 1993)) (“[A] 
bank generally owes no fiduciary duty to its depositors.”); Kaser v. Swann, 141 F.R.D. 337, 341 
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way and held that bank depositors are owed a duty of care.98 Secondary 
authorities and commentators have been similarly split on this issue, with 
 
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (citing Hooper v. Barnett Bank, 474 So.2d 1253, 1257 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985)) 
(“Generally, a bank-depositor transaction is treated as a debtor-creditor relationship and does not 
create a fiduciary duty.”); Copesky v. Superior Court, 229 Cal. App. 3d 678, 693–94 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1991) (rejecting the claim that the bank-depositor relationship is “quasi-fiduciary” and concluding 
that “banks . . . are not fiduciaries for their depositors . . . such as to give rise to tort damages when 
an implied contractual covenant of good faith is broken”); Wood & Huston Bank v. Malan, 815 
S.W.2d 454, 458 (Mo. 1991) (citing Estate of Parker, 536 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Mo. 1976)) (“G]enerally, 
the relationship between a bank and its depositor involves a contractual relationship between a 
debtor and a creditor.”); Irons v. Cmty. State Bank, 461 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) 
(citing Kurth v. Van Horn, 380 N.W.2d 693, 696 (Iowa 1986)) (“Generally, a fiduciary duty . . . 
does not arise solely from a bank-depositor relationship.”); Mann Farms, Inc. v. Traders State Bank, 
801 P.2d 73, 76 (Mont. 1990) (“[T]he relationship between a bank and its customer usually does 
not give rise to fiduciary duty.”); Paskas v. Illini Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 440 N.E.2d. 194, 198–
99 (Ill. 1982) (“[We are unaware of any authority] which could indicate that, in Illinois, a fiduciary 
relation exists as a matter of law between a bank and its depositor. . . . Rather a debtor-creditor 
relationship exists between the depositor and the bank and the contract between the two controls 
their relationship.” (citations omitted)). Some states, such as Louisiana, enacted “clarifying” 
legislation stating explicitly that there is no fiduciary relationship between a bank and its depositors 
or other non-shareholders. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 6:1124 (2019). See also ABA SECTION LITIG., 
9 BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 92:45 (4th ed. 2019) (stating that 
“most courts have found that a bank does not owe a fiduciary duty to its depositors in the absence 
of special circumstances. The relationship between a bank and a depositor is a contractual, rather 
than a fiduciary one”). 
98. See, e.g., Champaigne v. Scarso, No. CV 970348470S, 1999 WL 54851, at *8 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Jan. 27, 1999) (“Banks and their depositors are bound by a special relationship. Because of this 
relationship, banks owe a duty of ordinary care to their depositors.”); In re Hutchins, 216 B.R. 11, 
14 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1997) (stating that directors of financial institutions owe fiduciary duties to 
the bank’s depositors); FDIC v. Eltrex Int’l Corp., No. CIV. 91-434-JD, 1994 WL 258673, at *5 
(D.N.H. Feb. 1, 1994) (“Pursuant to New Hampshire law, a bank owes a fiduciary duty to its 
depositors.”); Billman v. State of Md. Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 593 A.2d 684, 697–98 (Md. 1991) 
(stating that directors and officers of a savings and loan institution “owe a higher duty of care than 
is owed by their counterparts in a general corporation . . . because they are entrusted with funds 
belonging to the general public”); Mercury Serv., Inc. v. Allied Bank of Tex., No. 88-6550, 1990 
WL 90216, at *3 (9th Cir. July 2, 1990) (citing Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 
Cal. App. 3d 511 (1985)) (noting that, in California, “a bank owes fiduciary duties to its 
depositors”); Irving Bank Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 845 F.2d 1035, 1039 
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that bank directors owe a duty to “shareholders and depositors alike”); 
Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 820–24 (N.J. 1981) (stating that, in New Jersey, bank 
directors owe a duty of ordinary care to depositors); First Nat’l Bank of La Marque v. Smith, 436 
F. Supp. 824, 830–31 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (noting that, in Texas, bank directors owe a higher duty 
than other types of directors “because of the duty to depositors”), vacated in part on other grounds, 
610 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1980); Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d 1385, 1388–89 (8th Cir. 1979) (citing 
WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, 3 FLETCHER’S CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
§ 845 (1975)) (“[I]t is well settled that the fiduciary duty of a bank officer or director is owed to 
the depositors and shareholders of the bank . . . .”). But see Keith R. Fisher, Nibbling on the 
Chancellor’s Toesies: A “Roguish” Concurrence with Professor Baxter, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 45, 58–59 (1993) (arguing that Lane v. Chowning incorrectly cited the fiduciary duty 
concept articulated in Fletcher’s Cyclopedia, which referred specifically to mutual savings banks 
owned by their depositors). 
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many observers concluding that there is no fiduciary duty owed to bank 
depositors,99 and others arguing the contrary view.100 
The banking regulators themselves have consistently and forcefully 
argued that bank directors and officers owe a fiduciary duty not only to 
their shareholders but also to their creditors. Indeed, at least one 
prominent regulator has gone much further, arguing that bank directors 
owe a fiduciary duty not only to depositors but also to the federal 
government in its role as the insurer of those depositors.101 This argument 
was famously made by Harris Weinstein, the then-Chief Counsel of the 
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)—at the time, the primary federal 
regulator for nationally chartered thrift institutions—who stated that 
“every fiduciary of a federally insured depository institution owes the 
federal insurer, at the very minimum, the very same high fiduciary duties 
that are owed depositors. . . [including] the duty not to risk insolvency 
and the resulting loss of funds deposited with the institution.”102 
In support of this claim, Weinstein advanced three “Hornbook 
principles” of law. First, Weinstein argued that under principles of 
insurance law, “the insurer who covers a loss is subrogated to the rights 
of the insured,” which in the case of depositors include the right to seek 
“money damages against fiduciaries who have failed to safeguard 
deposits.”103 Second, citing Judge Stanley Sporkin, Weinstein asserted 
that the federal deposit insurer was analogous to equity investors, since 
the “federal government’s interest. . . is many times that of [any other 
equity holder].”104 Since the government in its role as deposit insurer 
 
99. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 52, at 24–25 (arguing that the statutory prohibition on unsafe 
or unsound conduct is distinct from a fiduciary duty, and that no fiduciary duty to depositors exists); 
Fisher, supra note 98, at 57–58 (arguing that the claim that bank depositors are owed a fiduciary 
duty stems from the judicial misinterpretation of several key opinions and sources); 10 AM. JUR. 
2D Banks and Financial Institutions § 708 (2020) (“[W]hile banking institutions undertake and 
solicit the trust of their depositors and as a consequence thereof are burdened with heavy 
responsibility, the relationship of this institution to the depositor is not typically deemed to be 
fiduciary in nature.” (citations omitted)). 
100. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, The Fiduciary Duties of Bank Directors, 
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/ 
professorbainbridgecom/2013/03/the-fiduciary-duties-of-bank-directors.html [https://perma.cc/ 
G6HW-HV4D] (concluding that bank directors owe a fiduciary duty to depositors, even if this is 
not “what the law ought to be”); Harvey R. Miller, Corporate Governance in Chapter 11: The 
Fiduciary Relationship Between Directors and Stockholders of Solvent and Insolvent Corporations, 
23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1467, 1478 (1993) (“[D]irectors of banking institutions owe fiduciary 
duties to depositors.”); Richard M. Cieri et al., The Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Financially 
Troubled Companies, 3 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 405, 407 (1994) (“[D]irectors of banking institutions 
owe fiduciary duties to the bank’s depositors . . . .”). 
101. See Harris Weinstein, Address at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas (Sept. 
13, 1990), in 55 BNA BANKING REP. 508, 510–11 (1990). 
102. Id. at 511. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. (citing Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 905 (D.D.C. 1990)). 
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holds “an unlimited negative equity risk while it has none of the potential 
for gain that common shareholders enjoy,” it deserves “the highest 
conceivable standard of fiduciary conduct.”105 Finally, Weinstein 
analogized the federal government’s role as deposit insurer of a failing 
bank to the role of a creditor of an insolvent or near insolvent debtor, 
noting that such a debtor owes a fiduciary duty to creditors under well 
settled principles of bankruptcy law and arguing that a similar fiduciary 
duty should be owed to the federal government.106 
Weinstein’s contention that bank directors and officers owe a fiduciary 
duty to the federal government was controversial and met with a great 
deal of criticism at the time it was made.107 But while Weinstein’s 
arguments may have been unsuccessful in reshaping the law, the claim 
that bank directors owe duties beyond those owed by corporate directors 
remains salient. For example, in recent Congressional testimony, the 
Comptroller of the Currency reiterated the point that the “primary 
fiduciary duty [of bank directors] is to ensure the safety and soundness of 
the national bank or federal savings association.”108 The FDIC continues 
to maintain as a matter of policy that bank directors and officers owe 
fiduciary duties to “the shareholders and creditors of their 
institutions”.109 
As the preceding analysis illustrates, there is some dispute over the 
issue of whether a fiduciary duty is owed to anyone other than bank 
shareholders. While there was a clear movement towards expanding bank 
fiduciary duties to depositors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, this movement was disrupted by the extraordinary stability of 
the banking system—and consequent absence of litigation against bank 
 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Notably, the General Counsel of the FDIC, the other main federal deposit insurer, publicly 
declined to agree with Weinstein’s position. See FDIC General Counsel Declines to Embrace 
Higher Duty for Fiduciaries in Failing Banks, 55 BNA BANKING REP. 941, 941–42 (1990). Other 
commentators at the time also publicly critiqued Weinstein’s expansive conception of fiduciary 
duties. See generally Brian W. Smith & M. Lindsay Childress, Avoiding Lawyer Liability in the 
Wake of Kaye, Scholer, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 385, 388–90 (1993); Lawrence J. Fox, 
OTS v. Kaye, Scholer: An Assault on the Citadel, 48 BUS. LAW. 1521, 1522–25 (1993); Fisher, 
supra note 98, at 46; Baxter, supra note 52, at 15–23; Andrew J. Nussbaum, Like Money in the 
Bank? An Economic Analysis of Fiduciary Duties to Protect the S&L Deposit Insurance Fund, 44 
ADMIN. L. REV. 355, 359–83 (1992); H. Brent Helms, Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, 
and Enforcement Act: An Ethical Quagmire for Attorneys Representing Financial Institutions, 27 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 277, 283–87 (1992); Thomas C. Rice & Blake A. Bell, Liability of Lender’s 
Counsel, A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION C665, at 277–282 (Oct. 31, 1991). 
108. Implementing Wall Street Reform, 112th Cong. 25 (2012) (statement of Thomas J. Curry, 
Comptroller of the Currency). 
109. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., STATEMENT CONCERNING THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF BANK 
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS, STATEMENT OF POLICY 5000 (1992) (emphasis added), available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-3300.html [https://perma.cc/4M85-PNPH]. 
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directors and officers—in the post-New Deal era. By the time the 
question of bank fiduciary duties was next seriously revisited in the late 
twentieth century, most courts had largely reverted back to the 
shareholder-centric view that was dominant in corporate law. That being 
said, federal banking regulators have continued to maintain that bank 
directors and officers owe a fiduciary duty of safety and soundness, which 
may be tied to their duties to depositors. 
2.  Statutory Duties 
The issue of bank fiduciary duties is further complicated by Congress’s 
creation of statutory duties for bank directors. The National Banking Act 
of 1863 and subsequent Congressional legislation allowed bank directors 
to be held personally liable for certain violations committed by the bank 
or its officers, but only if the directors had actual knowledge of these 
acts.110 These violations historically included exceeding certain statutory 
limits on loans made to a single borrower, real estate lending, and 
securities underwriting.111 
Congress also created a duty of safety and soundness for bank directors 
with its passage of the Banking Act of 1933, which was revised and 
expanded over time. The Banking Act of 1933 authorized the removal of 
national bank directors for engaging or participating in any “unsafe or 
unsound banking practices.” While the term “unsafe or unsound banking 
practices” may be vague, the “authoritative definition”112 was provided 
by John Horne, then the Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 
in an influential 1966 memorandum, in which he stated: 
Like many other generic terms widely used in the law, such as “fraud,” 
“negligence,” “probable cause,” or “good faith,” the term “unsafe or 
unsound practices has a central meaning which can and must be applied 
to constantly changing factual circumstances. Generally speaking, an 
“unsafe or unsound practice” embraces any action, or lack of action, 
which is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent operation, 
the possible consequences of which, if continued, would be abnormal 
risk or loss or damage to an institution, its shareholders, or the agencies 
administering the insurance funds.113 
 
110. 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (2019). 
111. McCoy has an informative discussion of these limits on national bank activities. See 
McCoy, supra note 75, at n66–67 and accompanying text. 
112. See Gulf Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259, 264 (5th 
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982) (noting that both Houses adopted John Horne’s 
definition of “unsafe or unsound practices”); see also Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary Duties’ 
Demanding Cousin: Bank Director Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 175, 190–91 (1995) (describing how courts definining unsafe or unsound banking 
practices “have relied on either Chairman Horne’s definition or one almost identical to it”). 
113. Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act of 1966: Hearings on S. 3158 and S. 
3695 Before the House Comm. On Banking and Currency, 89th Cong. 50 (1966). 
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As Heidi Mandanis Schooner has described, the duty to refrain from 
unsafe or unsound practices has expanded over time, and today “serve[s] 
as a statutory trigger for every important formal enforcement proceeding 
available against bank directors.”114 Congress greatly expanded the 
scope of the safety and soundness duty of bank directors—both in terms 
of the parties that are impacted by the duty as well as the potential 
consequences of violating the duty—with its passage of the Federal 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 
(FIRREA).115 FIRREA grants federal banking regulators the authority to 
levy penalties against not only directors and officers, but also “institution-
affiliated parties”—including third parties such as controlling 
stockholders, consultants, lawyers, and accountants116—who have 
“engaged or participated” in unsafe or unsound conduct.117 These 
penalties include cease-and-desist orders,118 removal from the bank,119 
removal and prohibition from participation in the bank’s affairs,120 
removal and prohibition from participation in any banking activities,121 
civil money penalties ranging up to as high as $1 million a day,122 and 
criminal liability including up to five years in prison.123 
Congress also passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA),124 which among other things 
created a host of new statutory rules banning, limiting, or otherwise 
regulating many lending practices that were once excluded from liability 
by the business judgment rule. In particular, FDICIA required federal 
banking regulators to “adopt uniform regulations prescribing standards” 
 
114. Schooner, supra note 112, at 188 (citing Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 30, 48 Stat. 162, 
193-94). See also Baxter, supra note 52, at 11–13 (describing how Congress increased the range of 
enforcement options available to bank regulators over time). 
115. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. 
L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (Aug. 9, 1989). 
116. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u) (2019). 
117. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1)(A) (2019) FIRREA also articulates a third basis for removing 
or otherwise levying penalties against a bank or institution-affiliated party: violating a law, 
regulation, final cease-and-desist order, or written agreement between the institution and the FDIC. 
Id. at (II)(7). In order to initiate removal proceedings, the bank regulator must also find that the 
improper conduct resulted in certain negative consequences, see 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1)(B), and 
that certain scienter requirements are satisfied. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1)(C). See also Robert J. 
Basil, Suspension and Removal of Bank Officials Under the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery 
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 18 J. LEG. 1, 16–17 (1992) (describing the agency’s ability 
to regulate or eliminate an official’s participation in the banking community indefinitely). 
118. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(b)–(c) (2019). 
119. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1). 
120. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(3). 
121. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(7). 
122. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) (2019). 
123. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(j) (2019). 
124. FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 131, 105 Stat. 2236, 2258 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
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related to real estate loans.125 These interagency regulations and 
guidelines, applicable to all federally insured banks and thrifts, were 
issued in their final form in December 1992, and imposed an array of new 
duties and obligations on bank directors related to real estate lending.126 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (OCC)—the primary federal regulator for nationally 
chartered banks—developed and implemented a new set of “heightened 
expectations” for corporate governance and oversight for large national 
banks.127 These new guidelines were promulgated into law as an 
appendix to the OCC’s regulations on safety and soundness standards for 
large national banks and savings associations.128 Under these guidelines, 
the boards of large national banks are required to establish and oversee 
an effective risk management framework, provide active oversight of 
management, exercise independent judgment, include at least two 
independent directors on the board, and provide ongoing training to all 
directors.129 While these requirements were not framed as fiduciary 
duties, the Comptroller has made clear that the OCC views these 
heightened standards as related to directors’ fiduciary responsibilities, 
which he described as follows: “The [bank] charter is a special corporate 
franchise that provides a gateway to federal deposit insurance and access 
to the discount window, and the highest fiduciary duty of the Board of 
Directors is to ensure the safety and soundness of the national bank or 
federal thrift.”130 
One important question on the relationship between statutory duties 
and fiduciary duties is whether the former replace or complement the 
latter. This question was resolved in a 1938 Sixth Circuit case called 
Atherton v. Anderson involving a bank receiver’s claims of negligence 
against the bank’s officers and directors based in part on the bank’s 
 
125. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(o) (2019). 
126. 12 C.F.R. pt. 34, subpt. D, app. A (2018); id. pt. 208, app. C; id. pt. 365, app. A; id. pt. 
563, subpt. D, app. A. See also McCoy, supra note 75, at 50–52 (discussing federal bank regulators’ 
new rules regulating loan practices that once qualified for the business judgment rule). 
127. See Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Finalizes Its 
Heightened Standards for Large Financial Institutions (Sept. 2, 2014), https://www.occ.treas.gov/ 
news-issuances/news-releases/2014/nr-occ-2014-117.html [https://perma.cc/KG4N-MUY3]. See 
also Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the Clearing House Second 
Annual Business Meeting and Conference 5 (Nov. 15, 2012), available at 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2012/pub-speech-2012-165.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q8JY-CK8U] (“We have adopted and are implementing what we refer to as 
‘heightened expectations for corporate governance and oversight.’”). 
128. OCC Guidelines Establishing Heightened Standards for Certain Large Insured National 
Banks, Insured Federal Savings Associations, and Insured Federal Branches; Integration of 
Regulations, 79 Fed. Reg. 54,518, 54,518 (Sept. 11, 2014). 
129. Id. at 54,537–38. 
130. Curry, supra note 127, at 7. 
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excessive and reckless lending to a single borrower.131 The defendants 
argued that these common law negligence claims were barred by the 
existence of statutory liability for the same misconduct.132 The Sixth 
Circuit rejected this logic and stated quite clearly that the statutory 
liability for bank directors created by the National Banking Act, while 
“exclusive of all other rules . . . does not modify or change the common 
law defining the duties of bank directors or the judicial methods by which 
the performance or non-performance of such duties may be 
determined.”133 In other words, the statutory creation of duties on bank 
directors does not replace any common law fiduciary duties that may 
already exist. 
The distinction between statutory duties and common law fiduciary 
duties may seem like a theoretical one from the perspective of bank 
directors and officers facing potential liability, but these differences are 
potentially significant. As Prof. Lawrence Baxter has argued, statutory 
duties are clearly delineated, well understood, and utilized by bank 
regulators as part of their formal enforcement powers, whereas fiduciary 
duties are vague, open-ended and typically utilized by aggrieved 
shareholders under a common law cause of action.134 Moreover, federal 
statutory liability for bank directors requires either actual knowledge of 
specified bank misconduct or engagement or participation in unsafe or 
unsound conduct. These standards are much higher than the gross 
negligence standard used in common law actions based on a breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
But while statutory duties may be distinct from common law fiduciary 
duties, as a practical matter, both types of duties affect the incentives of 
bank directors and officers in similar ways. From the perspective of a 
bank director, the open-ended liability that may accompany a breach of 
fiduciary duty should have similar effects as the statutory penalties that 
accompany unsafe or unsound conduct. As Professor McCoy has aptly 
put it, “[b]ank director negligence law, as it stands today, is a strange and 
baffling amalgam. State law provides the nominal rule of decision, but 
federal, code-based standards largely define the duty of care.”135 
 
131. Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883, 893 (6th Cir. 1938). 
132. Atherton, 99 F.2d 883 at 897 (“It is said that if there was no violation of the statute at all 
or if there was and yet appellants did not knowingly permit it or participate in it, or assent to it . . . 
they incurred no liability whatever because the liability imposed by the statute was exclusive.”). 
133. Id. The Sixth Circuit’s decision was made on remand from the Supreme Court. In its initial 
decision in this matter, the Sixth Circuit held that the common law negligence claims were barred 
based on procedural grounds. Atherton v. Anderson, 86 F.2d 518, 522 (6th Cir. 1936). The Supreme 
Court reversed in a succinct per curiam opinion. Anderson v. Atherton, 302 U.S. 643, 643 (1937). 
134. See generally Baxter, supra note 52, at 8–9. 
135. McCoy, supra note 75, at 55. 
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D.  The Bifurcation of Governance and Prudential Regulation 
The uneasy coexistence of bank safety and soundness duties (based on 
federal law) and bank fiduciary duties (based on state law) described in 
the previous section, is part of a deeper schism between prudential 
regulation and bank governance whose origins are rooted in the National 
Bank Act of 1863 (NBA).136 which created a “dual banking system” of 
federal- and state-chartered banks that is unique to the United States. 
Prior to the enactment of the NBA, the chartering and regulation of banks 
had been exclusively the province of the states,137 many of which had 
liberalized the granting of bank charters as part of the Free Banking 
Era.138 Congress passed the NBA to create a uniform national currency, 
and also to stimulate demand for US debt instruments in the midst of a 
costly Civil War.139 
To achieve these aims, the NBA authorized the chartering of national 
banks to be overseen by the newly created Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency.140 Congress also passed a parallel 10 percent tax on notes 
issued by state-chartered banks, which was intended to both facilitate the 
adoption of national bank notes and also to tax state banks out of 
existence.141 But state banks managed to survive and thrive by inventing 
 
136. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
137. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. During the Free Banking Era, state banking 
authorities allowed any organizers that met certain minimum thresholds for capital and other 
requirements to obtain a bank charter. During this period, there were generally three types of safety 
and soundness regulations in place: first, a requirement that banks deposit a minimum amount of 
designated bonds (typically the chartering state’s bonds, although federal and other bonds were 
often acceptable as well) with the state banking authority; second, a requirement that the bank 
maintain enough specie on hand to pay any notes presented for redemption; and third, the double 
liability for shareholders described supra at notes 41–45 and accompanying text. See also Arthur 
J. Rolnick & Warren E. Weber, Banking Instability and Regulation in the U.S. Free Banking Era, 
9 FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS Q. REV. 2, 4 (1985) (discussing the history of the Free Banking 
Era). 
138. Rolnick & Weber, supra note 137, at 3–5 (discussing policies allowing for the unrestricted 
entry of new banks). 
139. See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO 
THE CIVIL WAR 725–27 (2d ed. 1985) (describing Congressional discussion on the proposed 
legislation); KENNETH SPONG, BANKING REGULATION: ITS PURPOSES, IMPLEMENTATION, AND 
EFFECTS 18–19 (5th ed. 2000); John Wilson Million, The Debate on the National Bank Act of 1863, 
2 J. POL. ECON. 251, 251–52 (1894). 
140. OFFICE COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, FOUNDING OF THE OCC AND THE NATIONAL 
BANKING SYSTEM, available at https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/who-we-are/history/founding-
occ-national-bank-system/index-founding-occ-national-banking-system.html [https://perma.cc/ 
VV45-JAZR]. 
141. The original bank bill of 1863 and 1864 contained a 2% tax on state bank notes, but this 
did not significantly reduce the outstanding supply of state bank notes and had no effect on the 
number of state banks in existence. See Bruce Champ, The National Banking System: A Brief 
History, 9 (Fed. Res. Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 07-23R). So, Congress increased the 
tax on state bank notes to 10 percent. See Lissa Lamkin Broome, The First One Hundred Years of 
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bank deposits and checking accounts as a means to avoid this tax.142 
These deposits were incredibly successful and as a result, the state 
banking system was able to survive and thrive despite the tax on state 
bank notes.143 
The establishment of a national bank system coupled with the failure 
to kill off the existing state banking system led to the much studied and 
oft criticized “dual banking system,” which the OCC has described as: 
. . .the parallel state and federal banking systems that co-exist in the 
United States. The federal system is based on a federal bank charter, 
powers defined under federal law, operation under federal standards, 
and oversight by a federal supervisor. The state system is characterized 
by state chartering, bank powers established under state law, and 
operation under state standards, including oversight by state 
supervisors.144 
At the federal level, the National Bank Act established a series of new 
prudential regulations for national banks, which included minimum 
capital requirements, reserve requirements, loan restrictions and regular 
examinations to be administered by the newly created Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency.145 Initially, these federal prudential 
regulations were limited to national banks, while state banks were 
overseen by the state banking authority under the prudential regulatory 
framework contemplated by the state’s laws. But over time, federal 
prudential regulation expanded to cover more and more state-chartered 
banks. 
In the aftermath of the Panic of 1907, Congress enacted the Federal 
Reserve Act of 1913,146 which established the Federal Reserve System 
as a form of decentralized central bank made up of twelve regional 
 
Banking in North Carolina, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 103, 121–22 (2005). The Supreme Court upheld 
this tax in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 (1869). As Hammond has documented, the 
Congressional proponents of the state bank note tax were explicit in their aim of destroying the 
state banks. HAMMOND, supra note 139, at 733. 
142. HAMMOND, supra note 139, at 734. See also Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve 
Bd., Remarks Before the Annual Meeting and Conference of the Conference of State Bank 
Supervisors, (May 2, 1998), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/ 
1998/19980502.htm [https://perma.cc/W97X-S6YB] (“Forced to find a substitute for notes, state 
banks pioneered demand deposits. Within ten years after the note tax, state banks had more deposits 
than national banks . . . .”). 
143. See HAMMOND, supra note 139, at 734. 
144. OFFICE COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, NATIONAL BANKS AND THE DUAL BANKING 
SYSTEM 1 (2003), available at https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-
publications-reports/national-banks-and-the-dual-banking-system.pdf [https://perma.cc/W97X-
S6YB]. 
145. See SPONG, supra note 139, at 19; Richard Sylla, Federal Policy, Banking Market 
Structure, and Capital Mobilization in the United States, 1863-1913, 29 J. ECON. HIST. 657, 659–
62 (1969). 
146. The Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 226 (2019). 
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Federal Reserve Banks meant to serve as a lender of last resort during 
times of crisis.147 National banks were required to join the Federal 
Reserve System, while state banks were given the option to join.148 The 
Federal Reserve Act required that any state banks that joined the Federal 
Reserve System submit to the same minimum capital requirements, 
reserve requirements, loan restrictions, and regular examinations that 
applied to national banks, effectively placing them into a federal 
prudential regulatory framework.149 
The federalization of bank prudential regulation—even for state-
chartered banks whose organizational activities and duties were overseen 
by state law—was massively expanded with the Banking Act of 1933. 
The Banking Act established federal deposit insurance and a new federal 
regulator—the FDIC—to administer and oversee this framework.150 The 
FDIC was given significant regulatory authority over banks to which it 
provided federal deposit insurance. Before admitting a bank to the federal 
deposit insurance program, the FDIC is required to examine the applicant 
bank, consider the adequacy of its capital, its future earnings prospects, 
the quality of its management, and its usefulness in serving the 
convenience and needs of the community.151 Once insured, banks are 
subject to rigorous examinations, and the FDIC can terminate its 
insurance to banks that were found to have unsafe or unsound 
practices.152 State nonmember banks are required to obtain FDIC 
approval before opening new branches, reducing their capital, or merging 
with other institutions.153 While state banks were generally not required 
to apply for federal deposit insurance (national banks and state banks that 
were members of the Federal Reserve were required to be insured by the 
FDIC),154 federal deposit insurance came to be seen as a “competitive 
 
147. See Michael Wade Strong, Rethinking the Federal Reserve System: A Monetarist Plan For 
a More Constitutional System of Central Banking, 34 IND. L. REV. 371, 376–77 (2001). The Federal 
Reserve System was also tasked with providing a flexible national currency that would be 
responsive to changes in supply and demand, supervising the banking industry across the fifty 
states, and improving the nation’s check-clearing system. Id. 
148. Id. at 377. 
149. See EUGENE NELSON WHITE, THE REGULATION AND REFORM OF THE AMERICAN 
BANKING SYSTEM, 1900–1929, at 97–99 (1983). 
150. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.). The FDIC was originally established as a temporary government 
corporation. Id. Congress enacted the Banking Act of 1935, which among other things, established 
the FDIC as a permanent federal agency. Pub. L. No. 74-305, 49 Stat. 684 (1935) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
151. Banking Act of 1935, § 101(g). See also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FEDERAL DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE CORPORATION: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS A HISTORY OF THE FDIC 1933–1983, at 51–
52 (1984). 
152. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 151, at 52. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 44. 
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necessity” that was almost universally adopted by state banks.155 The 
ubiquity of federal deposit insurance coupled with the significant 
regulatory authority this gave to the FDIC meant that federal prudential 
regulation was expanded to cover virtually all banks.156 
E.  The Declining Importance of Bank Charters 
While there are differences between bank governance and corporate 
governance, as outlined above, the importance of these differences has 
been sharply diminished by two modern trends. First, banks over time 
have become increasingly held by bank holding companies, which are 
typically organized as state-chartered corporations.157 Second, the 
economic importance of banks has been reduced over time by the rapid 
rise of “shadow banking,” which serves the economic functions of 
banking—and has many of the same systemic vulnerabilities—but 
operates outside of the traditional banking framework. Shadow banking 
is performed by investment banks, hedge funds, and other financial 
conduits that are not organized as banks and therefore not subject to the 
laws regulating bank governance. 
The principal economic or functional activity of banking has been 
described as the credit intermediation or maturity transformation that 
occurs when a bank uses the proceeds from its short-term liabilities (such 
as demand deposits) and invests them in long-term assets (such as 
mortgage loans).158 For most of our country’s history, this activity was 
performed almost exclusively within banks—depository institutions that 
had received a state or national banking charter.159 During this period, 
the “business of banking” was performed almost exclusively by financial 
institutions operating with a banking charter and its concomitant 
governance requirements. But over time, more and more of the activity 
of banking was overseen by non-bank officers and directors, due both to 
the increasing importance of bank holding companies and the rise of 
“shadow banking”—the functional activity of banking occurring outside 
 
155. See Butler & Macey, supra note 43, at 699. 
156. The federal prudential regulatory footprint was further expanded with the passage of the 
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987), which 
extended Glass-Steagall’s prohibitions on the commingling of commercial banking and investment 
banking, which had previously only applied to banks that were members of the Federal Reserve 
System, to all banks. See Butler & Macey, supra note 43, at 696–97. 
157. A bank holding company is defined as any company that controls one or more banks. See 
12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2019). A company can include a corporation, partnership, business trust, 
association or similar organization. See id. at § 1841(b). 
158. See Bryan J. Noeth & Rajdeep Sengupta, Is Shadow Banking Really Banking?, REG. 
ECON., Nov. 2011, at 8. 
159. MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 159–63 (2d ed. 2018). There are numerous types of banking 
charters including those for banks, thrifts, credit unions, and industrial loan companies. 
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of traditional deposit-taking banks, typically through investment 
banks.160 
1.  The Dominance of Bank Holding Companies Today 
A bank holding company (BHC) is a company that owns or controls a 
US bank and, as Professor Omarova and Ms. Tahyar have noted, is a 
“legal and organizational form unique to the US system of bank 
regulation.”161 BHCs first developed as a form of regulatory arbitrage, as 
this organizational structure allowed bankers to effectively bypass the 
severe geographic restrictions on chartered banks that historically existed 
in the United States.162 State laws limiting branching and other forms of 
geographic expansion, both within and across state borders, limited the 
ability of banks to expand beyond a single location.163 In 1933, Congress 
passed the McFadden Act establishing similar limits on the ability of 
national banks to branch.164 As a result, “unit banking”—in which small 
local banks served the banking needs of the public—was the norm in the 
United States through much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.165 
But these restrictions did not apply to BHCs, which could hold 
separately chartered banks in different states and localities, and 
effectively bypass geographic limitations on bank expansion. While the 
Banking Act of 1933 (amended in 1935), provided for the regulation of 
BHCs by the Federal Reserve Board, this regulatory authority was quite 
anemic and had limited scope. This Act applied only to BHCs that had 
50 percent ownership or control of a bank that was a member of the 
Federal Reserve system and sought to exercise voting control over its 
 
160. See Paul McCulley, Teton Reflections, PIMCO: GLOBAL CENT. BANK FOCUS (2007). 
161. See Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting the 
History of Bank Holding Company Regulation in the United States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 
113, 114 (2011) (citing PAULINE HELLER & MELANIE FEIN, FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY 
LAW § 1.04(5), at 1–20 (2009)). See also Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-
511, § 2(a), 70 Stat. 134 (1956) (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2019) (defining a 
bank holding company as “any company which has control over any bank or over any company 
that is or becomes a bank holding company by virtue of this chapter”). 
162. See Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 161, at 120–21 (noting that state laws frequently 
prohibited out-of-state banks from establishing branches within their state, due largely to the 
interest of local bank owners in protecting themselves from competition by larger banks). 
163. Id. (citing LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL 
SERVICE ACTIVITIES 69 (4th ed. 2011)); Robert T. Clair & Paula K. Tucker, Interstate Banking 
and the Federal Reserve: A Historical Perspective, ECON. REV., Nov. 1989, at 1, 3. 
164. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1933) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (2019)). The McFadden Act 
permitted national banks to establish branches within a state only to the extent permitted by that 
state’s law. 
165. See Carl Felsenfeld, The Bank Holding Company Act: Has It Lived Its Life?, 38 VILL. L. 
REV. 1, 9–11 (1993). 
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bank shares.166 As a result, many BHCs took advantage of the “regulatory 
gaps” that formed to “circumvent and evade sound banking principles, 
regulatory statutes, and declared legislative policy.”167 BHCs were 
created to avoid prohibitions on bank ownership of commercial concerns 
such as manufacturing businesses, restrictions on bank branching, and 
supervisory oversight of banks.168 
In response to these concerns and the rapid growth of BHCs,169 
Congress enacted the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA),170 
which created a formal regulatory framework for BHCs in the United 
States. Under the BHCA, all bank holding companies are subject to 
consolidated prudential oversight by the Federal Reserve and any 
nonbank subsidiaries they acquire must engage in activities “closely 
related to banking.”171 The BHCA was passed with several goals in mind: 
(1) to protect the public from banking monopolies and the concentration 
of economic power; (2) to preserve existing restrictions on bank 
branching and geographic expansion; and (3) to reinforce the Glass-
Steagall prohibitions on banks engaging in financial or industrial 
activities.172 
Following the passage of the BHCA and its amendments,173 the 
importance of BHCs in the US banking system grew rapidly, with 1567 
 
166. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 2, 48 Stat. 162 (1933); 12 U.S.C. §§ 61, 161, 
221 (2019). 
167. BD. OF GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., 30TH ANNUAL REPORT 34–37 (1943). 
168. Id. at 36–37. 
169. The first independently capitalized BHC was organized in 1927. See GAINES THOMSON 
CARTINHOUR, BRANCH, GROUP, AND CHAIN BANKING 96 (1931). By 1954, there were at least 114 
BHCs, according to the Federal Reserve Board. See H.R. REP. NO. 84-609, at 8 (1955). 
170. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, §§ 1–12, 70 Stat. 134, 135 
(1956). 
171. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (2019). The “closely related to banking” test governing BHC 
subsidiary activities was significantly revised with the 1970 Amendments to the BHCA. This 
standard was again changed with the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. See infra 
note 177 and accompanying text (explaining the Act’s sweeping changes to banking regulation). 
172. See George R. Hall, Bank Holding Company Regulation, 31 S. ECON. J. 342, 343 (1965). 
See also Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 161, at 120–25. (explaining the BHCA structure as an anti-
monopoly law). 
173. Congress amended the BHCA in 1966 and 1970. As Omarova and Tahyar describe, 
Congress amended the BHCA in 1966, with the primary changes in these amendments being to 
expand the definition of “company” to cover long-term trusts and religious, charitable and 
educational institutions, and to narrow the definition of “bank” to cover only institutions that 
accepted demand deposits or their equivalent. Omarova and Tahyar, supra note 161, at 139–42; 
Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 2(b), 80 Stat. 236. In 1970, Congress again amended the 
BHCA, primarily to cover BHCs that only controlled or owned one bank, which were not 
previously covered by the BHCA. Bank Holding Company Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 103, 
84 Stat. 1763–66. See also Samuel B. Chase, Jr. & John J. Mingo, The Regulation of Bank Holding 
Companies, 30 J. FIN. 281, 281–82 (1975). The 1970 Amendments also revised the “closely related 
to banking” test, described supra in note 171 and accompanying text, so that BHC subsidiaries 
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BHCs registered with the Federal Reserve at the end of 1971.174 At year-
end 1980, there were 2860 BHCs owning 4942 banks, which was 34.3 
percent of all banks.175 By year-end 1995, there were 5194 BHCs owning 
7509 banks, which was 76.7 percent of all banks.176 The importance of 
BHCs was supercharged by the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley), which made sweeping changes to the 
BHCA and the bank regulatory framework.177 Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
greatly expanded the powers and permissible activities of banks, bank 
subsidiaries and BHCs.178 Most notably, Gramm-Leach-Bliley allowed 
BHCs with well managed and well capitalized bank subsidiaries to opt 
for “financial holding company” (FHC) status. FHCs and their 
subsidiaries would no longer be limited to activities “closely related to 
banking,” but could engage in securities and insurance activities that had 
long been separated from banks under Glass Steagall.179 
The actions of regulators and Congress led to a massive consolidation 
in the traditional banking industry, as more banks and a greater share of 
 
were limited to activities that are “closely related to banking as to be a proper incident thereto.” 
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 101(a), 84 Stat. 1760. 
See also 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (2019); Charles D. Salley, 1970 Bank Holding Company 
Amendments: What Is “Closely Related to Banking?”, 56 FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA MONTHLY 
REV. 98, 100 (1971). 
174. See Chase & Mingo, supra note 173, at 282 (explaining that the number of BHCs increased 
as a result of the formation of one-bank holding companies). 
175. Chart of “Bank Ownership by BHCs December 1980 to December 2007,” BD. OF 
GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE: PARTNERSHIP FOR PROGRESS [hereinafter BHC Chart], available at 
https://www.fedpartnership.gov/-/media/bank-life-cycle/charts/bank-ownership-by-
bhcs.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/285G-6GLF]. 
176. Id. Another major contributor to the rising importance of the BHC was Congress’s 
enactment of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), which 
allowed BHCs to acquire banks in every state and removed most state restrictions on branching. 
See FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 52 (explaining large banks’ success in acquiring banks). 
177. Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 103, 113 Stat. 1338, 1342 (1999). 
178. See Paul J. Polking & Scott A. Cammarn, Overview of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 4 
N.C. BANKING INST. 1, 3 (2000). In the decades preceding the passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 
federal banking regulators—especially the Federal Reserve Board and the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency—had greatly expanded the permissible activities of banks and BHCs through new 
regulations and regulatory inaction, allowing banks and BHCs to engage in insurance and securities 
activities that had long been forbidden under Glass-Steagall. Id. at 2–3. The movement to relax 
Glass-Steagall by regulatory action (or lack thereof) reached its apex with the Federal Reserve’s 
conditional approval of the proposed merger of Citicorp, then the largest bank holding company in 
the United States, with Travelers Group, Inc., a financial services company engaging in insurance 
and securities activities. See generally Fed. Reserve Bd., Order Approving Formation of a Bank 
Holding Company and Notice to Engage in Nonbanking Activities, 84 FED. RES. BULL. 985 (1998). 
See also Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 25 
J. CORP. L. 691, 691–92 (2000) (arguing that Gramm-Leach-Bliley was simply a “formal 
recognition to the changes that had been taking place” due to regulatory evisceration of Glass-
Steagall). 
179. Polking & Cammarn, supra note 178, at 4–6. 
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bank assets became rolled up into the organizational structures of BHCs, 
and especially the largest FHCs. Between 1990 and 2005, there were 
seventy-four “megamergers” involving banks with assets of more than 
$10 billion each. Today, roughly 80 percent of all banks are owned by 
a BHC,180 and this figure significantly understates the importance of 
BHCs, as nearly all bank assets in the United States are controlled 
by BHCs.181 In total, US BHCs control over $15 trillion in total assets.182 
Thus, to the extent that there may be differences between bank 
governance and corporate governance, the former has become far less 
important over time. While bank directors may be subject to bank 
governance law, most of these banks operate within the structure of a 
larger corporation, whose directors are subject to corporate governance 
law.183 
2.  The Importance of Shadow Banking 
The rapid rise of “shadow banking” has also reduced the relative 
importance of banks.184 As I have described previously: 
Shadow banking utilizes a variety of capital market conduits and 
instruments, particularly money market mutual funds, short-term 
repurchase agreements, asset-backed commercial paper, and asset-
backed securitization. Like traditional banking, shadow banking uses 
short-term, high-quality, liquid liabilities to fund long-term, illiquid 
loans. But whereas traditional banking does this all “under one roof,” 
shadow banking performs this intermediation “through a daisy-chain of 
non-bank financial intermediaries in a multi step process.”185 
There is a growing literature finding that shadow banking serves the 
same economic functions of credit intermediation and maturity 
transformation as traditional banking, and is vulnerable to the same 
problem of bank panics.186 But because shadow banking utilizes capital 
markets institutions and products to perform this function, until Dodd-
Frank, it largely fell outside of the regulatory umbrella that covers 
 
180. BHC Chart, supra note 175. 
181. See Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi & James Vickery, A Structural View of U.S. Bank 
Holding Companies, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV., July 2012, at 65, 66–67 (noting the 
rapid growth in the size and scope of BHCs from 1990 through 2010). 
182. Id. at 65. 
183. See Renée Adams & Hamid Mehran, Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding 
Companies?, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 123, 124 (arguing that the 
existence of regulations should affect the structure of internal governance mechanisms). 
184. The term “shadow banking” was coined by economist Paul McCulley to describe the 
enormous amount of credit intermediation occurring outside of the balance sheets of traditional 
banks. McCulley, supra note 160. 
185. See Min, Market Discipline, supra note 1, at 1449–50. 
186. Id. at 1448–57. 
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traditional banks.187 By its very nature of regulatory arbitrage, shadow 
banking takes place primarily in non-bank financial firms, including the 
non-bank subsidiaries of FHCs as well as non-bank entities unaffiliated 
with bank holding companies, such as investment banks, insurance 
companies, mutual funds, and hedge funds. As a result, shadow banking 
actors (such as investment bank or BHC directors and officers) are not 
subject to bank governance law and are typically instead subject to 
liability under common law corporate fiduciary duties.188 
The displacement of banks by their capital markets counterparts has 
had substantial effects on the financial system. For example, looking just 
at investment banks, in 2004, the combined assets of the five largest US 
investment banks totaled $2.5 trillion, more than half of the $4.7 trillion 
held by the five largest US BHCs, and this figure would grow to $4.3 
trillion by 2007.189 At the same time, the largest BHCs are all financial 
holding companies, and their non-banking activities account for a 
sizeable share of their overall balance sheets.190 Overall, shadow banking 
has grown tremendously over the past several decades, and according to 
some estimates has surpassed the size of the traditional banking system, 
reaching a peak of $20 trillion prior to the 2007–08 financial crisis.191 
In summary, while the fiduciary duties of bank directors may be 
broader than those of corporate directors, both in terms of their scope and 
to who these duties are owed, these fiduciary duties have largely become 
irrelevant over time, as most banking activities today take place either 
under the organizational umbrella of a BHC or FHC, or even outside of 
the regulated banking context altogether. 
II.  WHY SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY IS INAPT FOR BANK GOVERNANCE 
As discussed in Part I, despite having had divergent bodies of law over 
time, the fiduciary duties for general business corporations and banking 
firms (either chartered banks, bank holding companies, or shadow banks) 
 
187. Id. at 1449–50. 
188. As Claire Hill and Richard Painter describe, beginning in the 1970s, most investment banks 
transitioned from being partnerships with unlimited liability for their equity investors to being 
corporations with limited liability for their equity investors. Claire Hill & Richard W. Painter, 
Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) 
Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 1173, 1176–83 (2010). 
189. FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 150. 
190. Id. at 56 (“The biggest bank holding companies became major players in investment 
banking.”). The actual share of assets accounted for by domestic banking subsidiaries varies sharply 
among the largest FHCs: at JPMorgan Chase & Co., domestic bank assets account for 86.1 percent 
of total FHC assets; at Bank of America Corp., they account for 77.9 percent of total assets; at 
Citigroup Inc., they account for 68.8 percent of total assets; at Wells Fargo & Co., they account for 
92.5 percent of total assets; while at Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and Morgan Stanley, domestic 
bank assets account for just over 10 percent of total assets. Avraham et al., supra note 181, at tbl. 1. 
191. Noeth & Sengupta, supra note 158, at 8–9. 
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are generally treated equivalently by the courts today. But is the legal 
treatment of bank fiduciary duties sound from a policy perspective? In 
particular, is the shareholder wealth maximization norm appropriate for 
banks and other leveraged financial institutions? Even within 
corporations, shareholder primacy is not a clearly obvious proposition. 
Shareholder primacy is most frequently justified in corporate governance 
with the argument that shareholders face uniquely high and intractable 
agency costs in dealing with the corporation and its decision makers.192 
But of course, the shareholder is not the only corporate stakeholder who 
incurs these agency costs. Creditors, employees, and others also own a 
piece of the corporation’s treasury and put their trust in corporate 
directors and officers to manage these invested resources. Thus, these 
non-shareholders also face principal-agent conflicts in their dealings with 
the firm.193 The corporate law literature has largely justified shareholder 
primacy in corporations based on the argument that shareholders, as the 
residual claimants, benefit most from fiduciary duties in their favor.194 
But as I argue in this Part, banks and other leveraged financial 
intermediaries have characteristics that undercut the arguments for 
elevating the interests of shareholders over other corporate constituents, 
particularly creditors. 
This Part lays out the traditional justifications for shareholder wealth 
maximization in corporate governance and then presents several 
arguments as to why these are inapt for the governance of banks and other 
leveraged financial intermediaries. There are three principal differences 
between banks and other types of businesses that are germane here. First, 
the high degree of leverage inherent to banks greatly increases the 
creditor-shareholder agency conflicts in bank governance and also makes 
it more likely that shareholder interests will be contrary to social welfare 
maximization. Second, the government’s role as either de jure or de facto 
guarantor of most bank liabilities effectively transforms the creditor-
shareholder conflict into a taxpayer-shareholder conflict. Third, the steep 
negative externalities that arise from bank failures provide a strong 
rationale against shareholder wealth maximization, since shareholders do 
not bear the full costs of bank risk-taking (even as they gain the full 
benefits). 
 
192. David Min, Corporate Political Activity and Non-Shareholder Agency Costs, 33 YALE J. 
REG. 423, 438–43 (2016) [hereinafter Min, Corporate Political Activity]. 
193. Id. at 443–44. 
194. As described supra in notes 58 and 59, there has been a strong push against this view. Most 
notably, the stakeholder model and the team production model have been posited as alternative 
theories of the firm that are both more descriptively accurate and normatively more justified than 
the agency cost model. See Min, Corporate Political Activity, supra note 192, at 441–43. 
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A.  Corporate Law Justifications for Shareholder Primacy 
The New Deal era banking reforms—and the legislative and regulatory 
changes that have been made since then—emphasize external prudential 
regulations such as examinations or minimum capital requirements, and 
have mostly ignored measures that could optimize the internal 
governance of these institutions. The deemphasis of governance, 
combined with the absence of litigation or other developments in the law 
of bank fiduciary duties as described supra in Part I, resulted in a lengthy 
scholarly neglect of bank governance.195 At the same time, for a variety 
of reasons, there was a significant body of corporate governance 
scholarship being developed over the same period, which has primarily 
focused on the agency costs between shareholders and managers that 
arise out of the corporate form and its separation of ownership and 
control.196  
From a theoretical perspective, the separation of ownership and control 
creates a principal-agent conflict between outside shareholders and inside 
directors and managers.197 These conflicts in turn create “agency costs,” 
the costs incurred by principals in trying to motivate optimal behavior on 
the part of agents as well as the costs incurred from suboptimal agent 
behavior.198 While shareholders are not the only corporate stakeholders 
to incur such agency costs,199 it has been argued that their agency costs 
 
195. See Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks, 9 ECON. 
POL’Y REV. 1, 91 (2003) (“[V]ery little attention has been paid to the corporate governance of 
banks.”). 
196. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 113–16 (1932); Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 
386 (1937); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976); Min, Corporate Political 
Activity, supra note 192, at 436–43. In recent decades, there has been an increasing recognition of 
the importance of non-shareholder agency costs, including those borne by creditors and employees. 
Id. at 443–50. 
197. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 196, at 113–16; Andreas Kokkinis, A Primer on 
Corporate Governance in Banks and Financial Institutions: Are Banks Special?, in THE LAW ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANKS 1, 4 (Iris H-Y Chiu ed., 2015). 
198. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 196, at 308–10 (defining agency costs as the sum of 
the monitoring and bonding costs incurred to ensure that the agent acts in accordance with the best 
interests of the principal plus any residual loss that may accrue to the principal from agent behavior 
that deviates from the principal’s interests). 
199. The dominant theory in corporate finance today is the so-called “nexus of contracts” 
model, which asserts that the corporation is best understood as a nexus between different corporate 
constituents such as equity shareholders, creditors, and employees, and serves to mitigate the 
significant transaction costs that would arise were these different stakeholders to contract with each 
other separately. Two other theories of the corporation that have gained some popularity in the 
corporate law literature are the “team production” and stakeholder approaches. Notably, all three 
of these theories recognize the importance of non-shareholder interests in the corporation, and that 
these can create potentially significant agency costs. See Min, Corporate Political Activity, supra 
note 192, at 438–43. 
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are most important, for a number of reasons.200 First, as residual 
claimants with unlimited upside, they have the most to gain from a 
corporate governance structure in which their interests are prioritized.201 
Thus, shareholders would be willing to pay the most (and compensate 
other stakeholders) for fiduciary duties that emphasize their own wealth 
maximization.202 Second, because shareholders, as the residual 
claimants, are paid only after all other claimants are paid in full, their 
incentives are aligned with other stakeholders insofar as they seek 
outcomes that benefit all stakeholders.203 Third, because other corporate 
stakeholders are fixed claimants, they are better able to protect their 
interests through contractual covenants, whereas shareholders, who 
essentially hold an open-ended claim, are most poorly positioned to 
protect their interests through contract.204 
The longstanding focus on shareholder agency costs has led to a 
corresponding emphasis in corporate law and corporate finance 
scholarship on minimizing agency conflicts between corporate decision 
makers and shareholders. As Professor Frederick Tung has described: 
“Traditionally, the central challenge [in corporate law] has been to design 
governance arrangements optimally to close the gap between ownership 
and control: to channel managers’ discretion to benefit one specific class 
of investor—common shareholders.”205 In particular, corporate 
governance scholars have focused on three general areas of concern—
executive compensation, excess free cash flow, and managerial empire-
building.206 Executive compensation is thought to be a source of potential 
agency costs between corporate managers and shareholders—especially 
when that compensation is primarily or entirely given in the form of a 
fixed salary, as was the norm among corporations for most of the 
 
200. Id. at 450–55. 
201. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 65–68 (2008). 
202. Id. 
203. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 
403 (1983). 
204. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 201, at 69; see also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 196, at 337–
39. See also Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making 
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 
25 (1991) (arguing that shareholder primacy is justified because shareholders are “the group that 
faces the most severe set of contracting problems with respect to defining the nature and extent of 
the obligations owed to them by officers and directors”). Macey points specifically to poison puts 
for creditors and golden parachutes for employees as examples of contractual provisions that more 
than adequately protect the interests of non-shareholder corporate constituents. Id. at 40. 
205. Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders 
in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 118 (2009). 
206. See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
1907, 1913–15 (2013) (tracing the shift in academic’s focus from separation of ownership and 
control to shareholder-manager agency costs). 
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twentieth century—and there has been a great deal of academic research 
focused on how to change executive compensation to more closely align 
the interests of corporate managers and shareholders.207 Excess cash flow 
has also been a major area of research in corporate governance, as the 
presence of large uninvested or undistributed cash flows has been argued 
to be a sign of high agency costs, since these are not allocated for the 
shareholders’ benefit.208 Finally, empire-building—the investment of 
resources into acquisitions and other forms of expansion which may 
provide suboptimal returns—has also long been seen as a key agency cost 
problem in corporate governance, as it is argued that this type of decision 
making represents managers acting on behalf of their own interests rather 
than the interests of shareholders.209 
A large body of corporate governance literature has arisen exploring 
both private and regulatory mechanisms for addressing these concerns. 
These proposed solutions include changes to executive compensation, 
altering the composition of the board of directors, increasing or 
improving disclosures, providing greater proxy access, and weakening 
poison pills and other barriers to shareholder action.210 Many of these 
proposals have been successfully implemented, to the point where one 
prominent scholar has referred to corporate governance today as a 
“shareholder-centric reality.”211 
Banks and corporations share the same agency conflicts between 
outside shareholders and inside managers.212 Because of the relative 
dearth of bank governance scholarship, many of the policy solutions in 
this area have tended to mirror the proposals offered in corporate 
governance. Thus, Dodd-Frank contemplates only a handful of minor 
 
207. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management 
Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 257–58 (1990) (discussing political pressures relating to 
corporate management compensation which do not extend to gains from stock ownership). 
208. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986) (“Conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
managers over payout policies are especially severe when the organization generates substantial 
[excess cash flow].”). 
209. See generally ROBIN MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM 
(1964); Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal 
Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831 (1993); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature 
of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990). 
210. See infra notes 255–258 and accompanying text. 
211. See generally Rock, supra note 206. 
212. This was not always the case with banking. Due to strict limitations on branching and 
interstate banking through much of the 19th and 20th centuries, a high percentage of banks were 
small and closely held up until the latter half of the 20th century. See Bernard Shull, Corporate 
Governance, Bank Regulation and Activity Expansion in the United States, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN BANKING: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2007). From a 
theoretical perspective, the agency problems that occupy so much of the corporate governance 
literature are largely moot for small and closely held companies. Id. 
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changes to the internal corporate governance of financial institutions,213 
including: provisions calling for increased disclosures related to 
executive compensation (including whether there are any “golden 
parachutes”);214 a non-binding shareholder vote on executive 
compensation;215 increased proxy access;216 and “clawback” mandates 
requiring corporations to develop and enforce policies that would take 
back incentive-based compensation from executives in the event of an 
accounting restatement.217 These measures are all aptly described as 
corporate governance solutions that are primarily concerned with 
reducing shareholder agency costs, by either more closely aligning the 
incentives of corporate executives and shareholders, or increasing 
shareholder control of managerial conduct. These solutions do not 
primarily address the concerns of bank creditors or safety and soundness 
(other than through the prism of shareholder concerns). 
B.  Why Shareholder Primacy Is Inapt for Banking 
While the arguments for shareholder primacy may be convincing when 
it comes to the governance of general business corporations (and many 
do not find them so),218 there are strong counterarguments against the 
prioritization of shareholder interests in banks and other leveraged 
financial institutions. As I detailed in the previous section, the 
prioritization of shareholder interests in corporate governance is largely 
based on the claim that shareholder agency costs are the most intractable 
and that prioritizing shareholders thus provides the optimal aggregate 
value for all corporate stakeholders.219 
But banks and other leveraged financial companies are distinct from 
non-financial companies in several important ways. First, they rely much 
more heavily on debt to fund their balance sheets. Second, most of this 
 
213. As Skeel et al. note, in addition to internal governance reforms, Dodd-Frank also affects 
LFC governance indirectly through its regulatory changes for key outside influencers of LFC 
governance, particularly credit rating agencies and the derivatives markets. David A. Skeel, Jr. et 
al., Inside-Out Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 147, 153 (2011). 
214. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 951, 953 (2019)). 
215. Id. at § 951. 
216. Id. at § 957. The SEC’s rule implementing Dodd-Frank’s § 957 was famously vacated by 
the D.C. Circuit in its controversial decision, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011). The D.C. Circuit found that the SEC had failed to adequately consider the economic 
consequences of its rule. Id. at 1148. 
217. 12 U.S.C. § 954 (2019). 
218. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 51, at 249 (taking issue with the principal-agent 
corporate model and the shareholder wealth maximization goal); Charles W.L. Hill & Thomas M. 
Jones, Stakeholder-Agency Theory, 29 J. MGMT. STUD. 131, 132 (1992) (noting that the 
stakeholder-agency model results in a “paradigm whose predictions are not always consistent”). 
219. See supra notes 199–204 and accompanying text. 
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debt is guaranteed by the federal government, either explicitly as in the 
case of bank deposits, or implicitly such as with commercial paper issued 
by systemically important financial institutions. Third, it is well 
recognized that the failure of weak LFCs can spill over and potentially 
cause the failure of even the strongest LFCs, and moreover that this 
contagion can create massive costs for the broader economy. These 
negative externalities are unique to banking and are not understood to 
exist for other types of business enterprises. As I argue in this section, 
these characteristics make the arguments for shareholder primacy inapt 
for LFCs. 
1.  High Leverage Creates Higher Creditor Agency Costs 
The first important difference between LFCs and other types of 
business firms is that LFCs typically have much higher levels of debt 
funding due to the nature of their business. This higher degree of leverage 
heightens the conflict between shareholders and creditors when it comes 
to risk. Since at least the 1970s, corporate finance and corporate law 
scholars have been studying the problem of creditor agency costs in the 
firm. The rise of the shareholder rights movement and the concomitant 
internalization of shareholder preferences by corporate directors and 
officers has heightened the tensions between creditors and the firm. Of 
course, shareholders and creditors share many interests when it comes to 
the activities of the firm—avoiding fraud, investing in profitable projects, 
and sound management. In general, both shareholders and creditors want 
to increase the value of the firm’s equity, as this means greater return for 
shareholders but also a larger buffer against insolvency for creditors. 
Indeed, bank regulators have long emphasized earnings and profitability 
as a measure of a bank’s health. 
But shareholders and creditors may also have opposed interests, 
especially when it comes to risk. In general, shareholders prefer greater 
risk, because as residual claimants they are entitled to whatever profits 
the firm makes once it has paid off its fixed obligations (including to 
creditors), but their potential losses are limited to the value of their 
investments. In any firm, there are theoretically situations in which 
shareholders will prefer a high risk, high reward project, as that 
maximizes their expected returns, even if that results in lower expected 
returns (perhaps even negative expected value) for creditors than 
alternative projects or investments.220 The divergence between 
shareholder and creditor risk preferences is widened by the high degree 
of leverage inherent to LFCs. From the perspective of shareholders, more 
 
220. David Min, Balancing the Governance of Financial Institutions, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
743, 752–55 (2017). 
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debt funding can enhance their return on equity, even as it increases the 
risk of insolvency for creditors.221 
Because leverage can greatly enhance the potential for shareholder 
profits, a high level of debt, such as exists in LFCs, creates more 
antagonism between shareholders and creditors. Shareholders may want 
to drive the firm towards activities and investments that carry greater risk, 
even if these are against the broader interests of the firm as a whole. 
Shareholders may also have strong incentives to delay or prevent 
bankruptcy or resolution proceedings, since at that point their equity is 
nearly worthless and any chance at returning to solvency—however 
risky—is in their self-interest.222 At the same time, investors in LFC debt 
are particularly risk averse and, for a number of reasons, place a particular 
premium on the stability and low risk of these instruments.223 The strong 
risk aversion of bank debt investors effectively increases the costs of any 
losses they may incur, and exacerbates the potential conflicts between 
bank creditors and shareholders. 
The idea that shareholder pressure may drive LFCs to take on greater 
risk is not merely a theoretical concern. The growing emphasis on 
shareholder wealth maximization in corporate boardrooms has led to 
greater risk taking, especially among financial firms. Indeed, as described 
above, many observers have identified shareholder pressure as a key 
factor in the excessive risk in Wall Street firms that has been blamed for 
the 2007–08 financial crisis.224 Financial firms that took on higher levels 
of risk from 2003–07 were rewarded with higher valuations than their 
more conservative counterparts.225 Shareholder pressure caused even 
reluctant bank managers to take on higher risk and more aggressive 
 
221. As I discuss in a previous paper, this dynamic is easy to conceptualize by looking to the 
expected returns for shareholders and creditors on the same project with two different funding 
models—one funded 50-50 with debt and equity, and the other funded with 90 percent debt. This 
project might have a negative expected value for creditors and the firm as a whole but still have a 
positive expected value for shareholders. Id. 
222. See Macey & Miller, supra note 40, at 53 (noting that shareholders have nothing to lose if 
risks do not pay off after they have lost their investments already). 
223. See Min, Market Discipline, supra note 1, at 1480–81. One of the key reasons for this risk 
aversion is because much of the debt issued by banks and LFCs serves the functional role of money. 
There is growing evidence that there is a significant “money premium” given to instruments that 
have the price stability, safety and liquidity needed to serve as money. Id.; see generally MORGAN 
RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM 29–49 (2016); Adi Sunderam, Money Creation and the Shadow 
Banking System (Dec. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://www.hbs.edu/ 
faculty/Publication%20Files/money_20131221_e9123de9-351b-43bc-bd83-5f5053b45e3a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UWH6-FADB]. 
224. See supra note 10. 
225. See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text; Bratton & Wachter, supra note 18, at 720–
21. 
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growth strategies.226 This risk-taking was detrimental to the interests of 
creditors. 
In short, while there are always potential conflicts between the 
shareholders and creditors of any business concern, the high degree of 
leverage for LFCs and the particular emphasis that creditors place on the 
safety of LFC debt heightens the relative agency cost concerns of these 
creditors and weakens the theoretical arguments for prioritizing the 
interests of shareholders of banks and other financial intermediaries. 
2.  Government Guarantees Implicate the Public Interest 
A second key difference between LFCs and other types of firms is that 
LFCs enjoy government guarantees on much of the debt they issue. Some 
of these guarantees are explicit, such as with FDIC’s guarantee on bank 
deposits, which is backed by the full faith and credit of the United 
States.227 It is also widely understood that many other liabilities issued 
by LFCs, particularly short-term liabilities that pose a risk to the financial 
system, enjoy implicit government guarantees.228 The federal 
government is thought to effectively guarantee the vast majority of short-
term debt instruments that fund both the traditional and shadow banking 
sectors.229 
 
226. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 18, at 720–21. See also Min, Market Discipline, supra note 
1, at 1485–88. Even the financial institution decision makers who managed to avoid taking on high 
risk during this period remarked on how difficult it was to do so in the face of strong shareholder 
pressure. For example, Wells Fargo’s Chairman and CEO John Stump recalled that avoiding high-
risk products such as option ARMs were “hard decisions to make at the time . . . we did lose 
revenue, and we did lose volume.” FCIC REPORT, supra note 2, at 108. According to Toronto 
Dominion CEO Edmund Clark, he was called an “idiot” for deciding to cease the bank’s activities 
in structured finance. Ed Clark, President & CEO, Toronto Dominion Bank, Remarks at National 
Bank 2010 Financial Services Conference, at 3 (Mar. 30, 2010). 
227. See David Min, How Government Guarantees Promote Housing Finance Stability, 50 
HARV. J. LEG. 437, 447–48 (2013) [hereinafter Min, Government Guarantees]. 
228. These include the implicit federal guarantee on obligations issued by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, see id. at 454–57, and implicit government guarantees on the debt obligations of 
“systemically important” financial institutions. See generally Zan Li, Shisheng Qui & Jing Zhang, 
Quantifying the Value of Implicit Government Guarantees for Large Financial Institutions, 
MOODY’S ANALYTICS (Jan. 2011), https://www.moodysanalytics.com/-/media/whitepaper/ 
2011/2011-14-01-quantifying-the-value-of-implicit-government-guarantees-for-large-financial-
institutions-20110114.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G6Q-SK6X]. During the 2007–08 financial crisis, the 
federal government also took steps to guarantee money market mutual funds, asset-backed 
securities, commercial paper, asset-backed commercial paper, and other short-term financial 
instruments, leading many to believe that investors in these types of financial instruments and 
markets also enjoy implicit government guarantees against loss. See generally BAIRD WEBEL & 
MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43413, COSTS OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS IN 
RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: A RETROSPECTIVE (Sept. 12, 2008). 
229. See David Luttrell et al., Understanding the Risks Inherent in Shadow Banking: A Primer 
and Practical Lessons Learned, 18 FED. RES. BANK DALLAS STAFF PAPER, Nov. 2012, at 19, 19–
20. 
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The prevalence of government guarantees in banking is relevant to 
LFC governance for at least two reasons. First, these guarantees reduce 
or eliminate the incentives of creditors to monitor and discipline the 
activities of banks and other LFCs. While I have previously argued that 
creditor discipline is not an effective means of reining in bank risk,230 
even for those who might disagree with this assertion, it is 
uncontroversial that creditor discipline is largely absent in today’s 
banking system due to the prevalence of government guarantees of bank 
liabilities.231 If creditors are not fully monitoring and disciplining LFC 
risk taking, then the private ordering justification for shareholder primacy 
falls apart. After all, if creditors aren’t keeping bank risk in check, why 
should the legal framework preference the interests of shareholders, who 
generally prefer much greater risk than other stakeholders? 
Second, and relatedly, government guarantees—whether explicit or 
implicit—on LFC debt liabilities effectively transfer the credit risk on 
these obligations from creditors to taxpayers. This transforms the creditor 
agency cost problem into a taxpayer concern, taking it out of the realm of 
private ordering and directly implicating the public interest. It is 
taxpayers, not creditors, who bear the risk of loss from bank failure. 
Therefore, it is inappropriate to simply allow shareholder interests to 
dominate based on a private ordering justification when there is a clear 
and compelling public policy rationale for a governance arrangement that 
limits LFC risk. 
3.  Negative Externalities in Banking 
A third difference between LFCs and other types of business concerns 
is that the failures of LFCs, unlike other firms, can create large negative 
costs for those who are not investors or direct stakeholders in the failed 
LFC. This problem of negative externalities in banking is well understood 
and the subject of much study. The failure of a single bank can cause runs 
to occur at other banks, even those that are well managed and well 
capitalized against losses.232 These runs can potentially lead to a financial 
 
230. See generally Min, Market Discipline, supra note 1. 
231. See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 VAND. L. REV. 293, 303–
04 (2012) (“[T]hese regulatory safety nets induce a bank’s suppliers of capital to disregard the 
riskiness of a bank’s loans.”). 
232. Bank runs occur when short-term creditors, such as bank depositors, rush to redeem their 
funds. While banks keep some liquid funds on hand to meet redemption requests, if enough short-
term creditors “run to the bank” all at once, this exhausts the bank’s liquidity and forces it to sell 
illiquid assets—perhaps at a loss—in order to meet these demands. See Min, Government 
Guarantees, supra note 227, at 475–77. As Professors Diamond and Dybvig have described, this 
problem of bank runs can cause even healthy and well managed banks to fail, by forcing them to 
liquidate performing assets in a fire sale dynamic and thereby suffer losses. See Douglas W. 
Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 
410 (1983). 
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crisis with devastating macroeconomic consequences, affecting those 
who are not directly invested in any of the underlying banks. 
Banks have several features that make them vulnerable to runs. First, 
as discussed above, they are highly leveraged.233 Second, their core 
business activity is investing in loans and credit products with high 
evaluation and monitoring costs, creating steep information asymmetries 
between bank insiders and outside investors.234 Third, banks have a 
severe maturity mismatch between their short-term liabilities (such as 
demand deposits) and long-term assets (such as loans).235 As I’ve 
described previously, these characteristics of banks and other LFCs make 
them prone to runs: 
The high level of debt means that a relatively small credit loss can 
render a bank insolvent. At the same time, the informational 
asymmetries inherent in banking mean that [short term creditors] do not 
know whether a particular sign of bank problems . . . is an indication 
that the bank is insolvent. Finally, the maturity mismatch of bank assets 
and liabilities means a bank does not have sufficient liquid assets to pay 
off more than a very small fraction of its liabilities at any given time. If 
a large number of depositors simultaneously seek to withdraw their 
funds from the same bank, that bank must find new sources of liquidity, 
and this may entail selling off its loans in a “fire sale” environment.236 
Because bank runs can cause even healthy banks to become insolvent, 
they can occur without any obvious trigger. Some banking scholars have 
postulated that bank runs can even be caused by random occurrences such 
as sunspots.237 Indeed, the vulnerability of banks to runs is a key cause 
of runs themselves. As one prominent banking regulator has said, it may 
not be rational to start a bank run, but it is rational to participate in one 
once it has started.238 Because of the informational opacity of bank 
investment portfolios, the average bank creditor is ill equipped to know 
whether her bank is well managed or not. But she does know that if she 
is first to redeem her funds from the bank she will likely be paid in full, 
whereas if she waits too long to join a bank run, she may find herself 
receiving only a fraction of the amount she is owed, or even nothing at 
all. 
 
233. See Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler, Banking in General Equilibrium 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1647, 1985). 
234. Id. 
235. Id. 
236. Min, Market Discipline, supra note 1, at 1429. 
237. See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 232. 
238. Wolfgang Münchau, The Only Way to Stop a Eurozone Bank Run, FIN. TIMES (May 20, 
2012), https://www.ft.com/content/5d7ff324-a0e6-11e1-9fbd-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/ 
GPX2-HL25] (quoting former governor of the Bank of England Mervyn King). 
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At the same time, a run on one bank can easily spread fears among 
creditors of other banks, causing further bank runs that can in turn 
potentially lead to a widespread banking panic or financial crisis. 
Banking panics are incredibly costly, not only for bank investors, but also 
for the broader economy. Until the New Deal era banking reforms were 
implemented in the 1930s, such panics were a regular part of the financial 
landscape in the United States, with major financial crises occurring in 
1814, 1819, 1837, 1839, 1857, 1861, 1873, 1890, 1893, 1907, 1914, and 
of course from 1929–1933.239 These crises are devastating for economic 
growth and capital formation. As Reinhart and Rogoff have found, due 
to a combination of declining tax receipts and increased public 
expenditures to stave off economic downturns, government debt 
increases on average more than 80 percent in the three-year period 
following a major financial crisis.240 
Even if we ignore the prior arguments against shareholder primacy and 
assume for the sake of argument that shareholder wealth maximization is 
the optimal outcome of private ordering among corporate stakeholders, 
the large negative externalities associated with LFC failures offer another 
potent basis for discarding shareholder primacy for these types of 
institutions. Because the costs of LFC failures can potentially affect 
parties that have no direct connection with the LFC, these costs—and the 
risk-taking that can lead to LFC failures—are necessarily a matter of 
public—and not just private—concern. 
C.  Shareholder Primacy and Prudential Regulation 
Because of the problems posed by banking panics, banking regulation 
is first and foremost designed to rein in excessive risk taking by banks 
and other leveraged financial intermediaries, as I describe in this section. 
Because of the very large negative externalities associated with bank 
failures, the regulatory regime for banks is singularly intrusive, with an 
extraordinary scheme of capital requirements and intensive 
examinations, among other things, designed to ensure the safety and 
soundness of these financial intermediaries. And yet—as is clear to 
anyone who studies banking law—safety and soundness regulation has 
historically emphasized external restrictions and mandates on bank 
behavior, and, with the exception of fraud, self-dealing, or other 
wrongdoing, has traditionally ignored the internal governance of banks 
and other financial intermediaries. 
Modern banking regulation, both in the United States and abroad, has 
 
239. See Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, 
and Bank Regulation, in FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 109, 113–19 (R. Glenn 
Hubbard ed., 1991). 
240. REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 3, at 142. 
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largely taken a three-pronged approach to limit the problem of banking 
panics. First, to protect against the problem of runs and panics, banks 
have been offered access to a “lender of last resort” (LOLR) (such as the 
Federal Reserve) and access to government guarantees on short-term 
funding (such as FDIC deposit insurance). The lender of last resort 
ensures that banks will have access to sufficient liquidity to meet all 
redemption demands, while the government guarantees obviate the 
economic rationale behind runs, by ensuring that all depositors will be 
paid at par (so long as the government itself is solvent) and therefore have 
no reason to run to the bank to redeem their funds. 
Second, to limit insolvency risk (which can cause runs but can also 
cause losses to taxpayers when LOLR and government guarantees are 
implemented), banks have been subjected to a relatively stringent 
regulatory regime meant to ensure that they will have sufficient capital 
relative to their risk, such that they will survive major credit losses, or 
alternatively, cause minimal losses to taxpayers if they do fail. This 
“safety and soundness” or “prudential” regulatory scheme emphasizes 
bank capital,241 but has also historically operated through other 
mechanisms as well, including activity restrictions, branching and other 
affiliate restrictions, and a relatively rigorous examination process.242 
Finally, in the event that insolvency occurs, bank resolution schemes 
are supposed to minimize taxpayer losses and also any moral hazard 
effects that might arise from providing bailouts to non-insured investors. 
Since the passage of the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, federal banking 
regulators have been required to resolve distressed banks using the 
method that results in the lowest cost to the FDIC’s Deposit Insurance 
Fund.243 This “least cost resolution” requirement is intended, among 
other things, to prevent the bailouts of uninsured investors, thereby 
eliminating or at least reducing expectations that they will benefit from 
implicit government guarantees. More recently, Dodd-Frank244 and 
Basel III245 also have emphasized measures meant to dissuade 
 
241. As I discuss infra, bank safety and soundness regulation also looks to several other factors 
including asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. See infra 
notes 265–75 and accompanying text. 
242. See SPONG, supra note 139, at 63–84; id. at 98–138. 
243. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (2019)). 
244. See generally id. 
245. The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision includes the central banks of all of the OECD 
countries and is the primary global standard setter for the prudential regulation of banks. See About 
the BCBS, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/about/ 
overview.htm?m=3%7C14%7C573 [https://perma.cc/L63K-3V8T]. The Basel Committee issues 
recommended prudential regulation guidelines that are intended to be adopted by the Committee’s 
members. See History of the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
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government bailouts of uninsured investors in their resolution of banks. 
Dodd-Frank’s “Orderly Liquidation Authority,” set forth in Title II of the 
bill, creates a new resolution regime for systemically important (“too big 
to fail”) financial institutions that is intended to provide regulators with a 
viable alternative to the choices it previously faced during a financial 
panic—either put the company into bankruptcy and risk jeopardizing the 
economic and financial stability of the country, or bail out the investors 
of the company.246 This Orderly Liquidation Authority is intended to 
prevent bailouts and impose losses on shareholders and creditors of 
failing financial institutions, thus avoiding the moral hazard effects that 
might otherwise arise. Basel III takes a different approach to avoiding 
bailouts, by requiring banks to issue “bail-in” debt—debt obligations that 
are contractually required to be written down or converted into equity 
when the bank’s health deteriorates to the point that a resolution is 
required.247 Because this bail-in debt is by its very nature not allowed to 
be bailed out, it serves as a private buffer against government rescues of 
other creditors. 
Notably, these regulatory mechanisms operate as external restrictions 
or mandates on bank activity. Bank safety and soundness regulation, for 
the most part, does not seek to affect the internal governance of banks. 
To the very limited extent that Congress or federal regulators have sought 
to influence bank governance in recent years, it has been with the aim of 
more closely aligning the interests of LFC managers and directors with 
LFC shareholders. For example, Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 
contains a handful of provisions intended to influence bank governance. 
These include increased disclosures related to executive compensation 
(including whether there are any “golden parachute” compensation 
packages),248 greater proxy access,249 and “clawback” provisions 
requiring corporations to develop and enforce policies that would require 
executives to return incentive-based compensation to the firm in the event 
 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm [https://perma.cc/4BZD-5VD2]. “Basel III” refers to a series 
of recommended reforms to bank prudential regulation issued between 2011 and 2014, meant to 
update the previous two sets of recommendations offered by the Basel Committee, commonly 
known as Basel I and Basel II. Id. 
246. S. REP. NO. 111-76, at 4 (2010). 
247. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, BASEL III AND BEYOND—THE TRILLION DOLLAR 
QUESTION: CAN BAIL-IN CAPITAL BAIL OUT THE BANKING INDUSTRY? 2–3 (Nov. 2011), 
available at https://www.pwc.com/jg/en/publications/basel-and-beyond-trillion-dollar-
question.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2UT-4398]. 
248. Dodd-Frank §§ 951, 953, 124 Stat. at 1376. 
248. Id. 
249. The SEC’s rule implementing Dodd-Frank’s § 957 was famously vacated by the D.C. 
Circuit in its controversial decision, Business Roundtable v. SEC. 647 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
The D.C. Circuit found that the SEC had failed to adequately consider the economic consequences 
of its rule. Id. at 1148. 
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of an accounting restatement.250 All of these seem to primarily benefit 
shareholders, either by improving bank transparency (which in turn helps 
shareholders to better monitor and discipline bank management) or by 
more closely aligning the incentives of managers with shareholders. 
Modern banking regulation’s emphasis on external regulatory 
oversight (as opposed to internal governance) has led to two problems 
that have undermined its overall goals of safety and soundness. First, 
because banking regulation has mostly ignored the incentives of bank 
managers and directors, the relationship between banks and their 
regulators has increasingly been an adversarial one, in which bank 
decision makers seek to take on greater risk while regulators seek to 
reduce bank risk. This puts regulators in a cat-and-mouse dynamic vis-à-
vis banks that have superior information, greater resources, and strong 
incentives to try to avoid regulation. As one leading banking consultancy 
has described: 
In a game of cat and mouse between regulators and shadow bankers, 
the mice will win. There are far more mice; they are typically better 
informed and better motivated than the cats; and the extraordinary 
complexity of modern financial products and the global scope of the 
industry give the mice a nearly limitless supply of nooks and crannies 
to hide in.251 
Second, banking regulation’s historical disregard of governance has 
meant that banking scholarship has also mostly ignored governance as a 
topic worth researching and developing. As Professor Christopher Bruner 
has observed, “[o]ne of the first intriguing insights to arise in the wake of 
the 2007 financial crisis was the realization that, as recently as 2009, the 
empirical literature on corporate governance in financial firms was quite 
thin.”252 Thus, even as policy makers have been seeking to reform the 
governance of LFCs, there has been a paucity of banking-specific 
research and solutions to draw from in this regard.253 As a result, many 
of the changes to LFC governance that have been implemented reflect the 
corporate governance scholarship and its emphasis on reducing 
shareholder agency costs, and do reflect the specific agency cost 
 
250. Dodd-Frank § 954, 124 Stat. at 1376. 
251. OLIVER WYMAN, STATE OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 2011: THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS OF 2015, AN AVOIDABLE HISTORY 8–9 (2011), available at https://www.oliverwyman.com/ 
content/dam/oliver-wyman/global/en/2016/jan/OW%20SoFS%202011.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6THM-SUV8]. 
252. Christopher M. Bruner, Conceptions of Corporate Purpose in Post-Crisis Financial Firms, 
36 SEATTLE L. REV. 527, 534 (2013). 
253. To be sure, there has been a nascent but growing movement among policy makers and 
scholars that has begun to recognize the inherent conflict between governance frameworks and 
prudential regulatory goals for banking. But this movement has led to only a handful of proposals, 
and most of these have been developed well after the 2007–08 financial crisis. See generally Min, 
supra note 220. 
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problems in banking. These reforms have tended to increase shareholder 
influence over LFC behavior, even as there are ample reasons, as 
described in this Part, to believe that shareholder empowerment tends to 
lead to greater risk taking that is adverse to the broader safety and 
soundness concerns of financial regulators and policy makers. In short, 
the corporate governance reforms adopted in response to the financial 
crisis have tended to exacerbate rather than address the misalignment of 
internal governance incentives with external macroprudential 
regulations. 
III.  FEDERALIZING BANK GOVERNANCE 
For all the reasons discussed above, deemphasizing shareholder wealth 
maximization for banks and other leveraged financial institutions is an 
appropriate goal. But how might we achieve this? There are a number of 
different pathways we might consider. One possibility is to reduce the 
risk-taking incentives of LFC executives, either by imposing personal 
liability on them254 or altering the compensation packages they 
receive.255 Another possibility is to realign the incentives of LFC 
shareholders by increasing their liability, with the goals of both 
decreasing shareholder pressure for greater risk-taking and also 
increasing shareholder monitoring of firm activity.256 Finally, we can 
 
254. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank § 954, 124 Stat. at 1376 (requiring corporations to implement “claw 
back” provisions recovering compensation from officers in the event of an accounting restatement); 
CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKS, BETTER BANKS: PROMOTING GOOD 
BUSINESS THROUGH CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT 149–51 (2015) (proposing the imposition of 
personal liability on financial executives for losses incurred in the firm’s insolvency); KENNETH R. 
FRENCH ET AL., THE SQUAM LAKE REPORT: FIXING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 50–51 (2010) 
(proposing setting aside some portion of executive compensation to be paid out at a later date if the 
firm has not received a government bailout or declared bankruptcy). 
255. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 249, 
253 (2010) (proposing that bank executive compensation be based on an indexed scale reflecting a 
mixture of common shares, preferred shares, and debt analogous to the overall financing structure 
of the company); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive 
Compensation for Risk Regulation, 15 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1207 (2011) (proposing that bank 
executive compensation include subordinated debt); Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive 
Compensation, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1821, 1850–72 (2012) (suggesting the use of “contingent 
capital”—debt that converts into equity upon certain events—as a part of executive compensation). 
256. Several scholars have proposed restoring double par liability—described infra in notes 40–
50 and accompanying text—for shareholders of financial institutions. See, e.g., Richard Ridyard, 
Toward a Bank Shareholder-Orientated Model: Using Double Liability to Manage Excessive Risk-
Taking, 2 UCL J.L. & JURIS. 141 (2013); Richard S. Grossman, Double Liability and Bank Risk 
Taking, 33 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 143 (2001); Macey & Miller, Double Liability of Bank 
Shareholders, supra note 40. Peter Conti-Brown has argued for an elective option in which 
shareholders of systemically important financial institutions could vote for unlimited shareholder 
liability in return for significantly lower regulatory requirements. Peter Conti-Brown, Elective 
Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409, 428–41 (2011). 
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look to rebalance the internal governance priorities of LFCs by changing 
the fiduciary duties owed by their directors and officers.257 
In this Part, I argue that changing fiduciary duties is likely to be an 
effective tool for improving the safety and soundness of banks and other 
LFCs. I further contend that such changes should be implemented at the 
federal level, rather than through the states, for a number of reasons. 
Finally, I provide some thoughts on how a federalization of fiduciary 
duties in banking might be implemented, and a set of parameters for what 
this duty should look like. 
A.  Why Fiduciary Duties? 
Before proceeding, I should address the threshold question of why 
fiduciary duties are an appropriate area for reform. This question has two 
parts—why governance generally, and why fiduciary duties particularly. 
With respect to the first question—why governance—some of this is 
addressed in the previous Part, but the short answer is that our current 
governance incentives for financial institutions are working at cross-
purposes with the safety and soundness goals we have emphasized for 
these firms. If we believe the policy priority of bank safety and soundness 
is of sufficient importance that it justifies the incredibly complex and 
cumbersome regulatory architecture that now exists for banking firms, 
then we should be eager to adopt changes to banking governance that are 
comparatively much less costly and intrusive. While policy leaders have 
made enormous efforts to reform and revise our external prudential 
regulation of banks over the past several decades, bank governance has 
remained largely untouched, and so even minor changes in this area could 
have far-reaching effects. 
At the same time, changes to the fiduciary duties of banking directors 
and officers could map on neatly to the existing regulatory framework 
that exists for US banking firms, which are governed both by state 
corporate law and by federal banking regulations (which themselves 
heavily influence firm behavior, as described below in Section C of this 
Part). As I explain below, changes to fiduciary duty standards could be 
utilized by both private actors using traditional corporate law as well as 
 
257. There have been at least two proposals for changes in the fiduciary duties owed under state 
law by SIFI directors and officers. Armour & Gordon have argued for amending the duties of care 
and loyalty to expand liability and heighten scrutiny. John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic 
Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 64–70 (2014). Schwarcz has pushed for 
a “public governance duty” that would exist side-by-side with existing fiduciary duties requiring 
directors and officers to consider the costs and benefits of risky activities against the potential 
systemic harms that might be caused to society. Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate 
Risk-Raking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 29–30 (2016). 
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by bank regulators wielding the expansive powers granted to them by the 
United States Congress. 
Finally, fiduciary duty changes are a natural starting point that, once 
adopted, would help to facilitate other downstream changes, particularly 
with respect to executive compensation and liability. After all, as the 
FDIC has noted, “[t]he board of directors is the source of all authority 
and responsibility. In the broadest sense, the board is responsible for 
formulation of sound policies and objectives of the bank, effective 
supervision of its affairs, and promotion of its welfare.”258 If we change 
the incentives of LFC directors and officers such that they no longer 
prioritize a principle of shareholder wealth maximization, it is far easier 
to imagine that changes to executive compensation or liability could and 
would be adopted as part of a broader realignment of internal governance 
priorities. 
B.  Why a Federal Solution Makes Sense 
If fiduciary duties are an appropriate mechanism for reform, then the 
next question we should ask is how they should be revised. We could 
seek to change the state fiduciary duty laws for some universe of financial 
institutions. Indeed, changing Delaware’s laws alone would have a 
massive impact, given the outsized influence that state has as far as 
corporate law. But doing this might be difficult, given the deep 
entrenchment of shareholder wealth maximization in that state’s case law, 
and an attempt to change longstanding laws that have been relied upon 
for decades could lead to significant litigation. Moreover, for changes in 
state corporate law to be truly effective, we’d need to change the laws of 
all fifty states, so as to prevent regulatory arbitrage and a race to the 
bottom. That could be difficult and would obviously be time-consuming 
and inefficient. Thus, it would seem that changing federal laws would be 
a comparatively cleaner, simpler, and more efficient approach to 
changing the fiduciary duties of LFC directors and officers. 
A move towards federalization of LFC fiduciary duties would also help 
to ameliorate some of the structural problems with banking regulation. 
As Professors Camacho and Glicksman have described, prudential 
banking regulation in the United States has historically suffered from 
excessive decentralization and overlapping authority259 for many of the 
reasons described above in this article. In recent years, and particularly 
since the 2007–08 financial crisis, there has been a strong push to try to 
 
258. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES, § 
4.1–1 (2018), available at https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section4-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QT3N-5J3M] [hereinafter FDIC RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL]. 
259. ALEJANDRO E. CAMACHO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT: A 
FUNCTIONAL AND DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK 176 (2019). 
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centralize and coordinate the regulation of financial institutions (and 
particularly large and systemically important financial institutions). 
Examples of this in Dodd-Frank include the creation of a new Financial 
Stability Oversight Council, to identify and oversee problems with 
systemic risk, and also the elevation of the Federal Reserve Board into a 
central role in regulating financial institutions.260 Federalizing fiduciary 
duties would help to centralize an important part of bank regulation—one 
that is currently administered almost entirely through state courts—and 
address some of the current issues of decentralization and overlapping 
authority that exist in this area. 
Relatedly, the creation of federal standards for fiduciary duties would 
bring prudential regulation and governance standards under the aegis of 
federal banking regulators, which would improve the efficiency of safety 
and soundness regulations and potentially eliminate the conflicts between 
these two areas of law. After all, as this Article has described, the schism 
between prudential regulation and bank governance is a recent 
phenomenon and not the result of any reasoned normative rationales. 
Until recently, banking regulation was a relatively simple and unified 
concept. Only firms with bank charters could engage in the business of 
banking, and this charter, whether issued by a state or the federal 
government, was tied to both a legal framework for governance and a 
prudential regulatory regime meant to ensure the safety and soundness of 
depositor monies and limit the threat of banking panics.261 
It was only with the rise of bank holding companies and shadow banks 
that the legal frameworks for prudential regulation and governance 
became untethered. Today, a slew of federal statutes and regulations 
meant to reduce banking risk apply not only to nationally chartered banks 
but also to state banks, bank holding companies, and even to non-bank 
financial firms designated as systemically important financial 
 
260. Id. at 179. 
261. The particulars of bank prudential regulation varied over time in the pre-Glass Steagall 
period. In the lightly regulated “free banking era,” described supra at notes 35–38 and 
accompanying text, the state banking authorities generally imposed three types of regulations: first, 
a requirement that banks deposit designated bonds (typically the chartering state’s bonds, although 
many states also allowed federal or other state bonds as well) with the state banking authority; 
second, a requirement that the bank maintain enough specie on hand to pay any notes presented for 
redemption; and third, the double liability for shareholders, described supra at notes 41–45 and 
accompanying text. See Rolnick & Weber, supra note 137, at 4. The widespread bank failures of 
the free banking era led Congress to enact the National Currency Act of 1863 and National Bank 
Act of 1864 with the goals of establishing a unified national currency and a national banking 
system. See SPONG, supra note 139, at 18–19; John Wilson Million, The Debate on the National 
Bank Act of 1863, 2 J. POL. ECON. 251, 251–52 (1894). This federal banking legislation established 
a national bank charter that was accompanied by a regulatory regime that included minimum capital 
requirements, reserve requirements, loan restrictions, and regular examinations to be administered 
by the newly created Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. See SPONG, supra note 139, at 19; 
Sylla, supra note 145, at 659–62. 
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institutions.262 Yet virtually all of these institutions are organized under 
the umbrella of a state business charter that requires the firm’s directors 
and officers to pay fealty to the principle of shareholder wealth 
maximization. As a result, we have a regulatory system whose component 
parts are quite often working at cross-purposes with each other: the state 
laws setting the incentives for governance in banking firms tend to 
encourage greater risk taking, even as the increasingly complex and 
cumbersome federal regime for banking institutions is almost entirely 
focused on limiting risk in these same firms. 
Until relatively recently, activities that were considered to fall within 
the definition of the “business of banking” were limited to those 
institutions with a bank charter.263 But the explosive growth of bank 
holding companies, financial holding companies, and shadow banking—
often aided by compliant regulators seeking to improve the 
competitiveness of their regulated entities—has meant that many firms 
other than traditional banks are now effectively engaging in the business 
of banking. The recent implementation of Dodd-Frank, the different 
Basel accords and financial regulatory rulemaking have expanded 
prudential regulation to cover many of these non-bank institutions. But 
there has been no similar expansion of financial firm governance. This 
has complicated the tasks of financial regulators, who now operate with 
a baseline assumption that the directors and officers of the firms they 
oversee are incentivized by state corporate law to act on behalf of their 
 
262. The Dodd-Frank Act established the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and 
granted it the authority to designate a non-bank financial company as a SIFI if the FSOC determined 
that the firm could potentially threaten US financial stability. 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2019). Any firm 
designated as a non-bank SIFI becomes subject to a number of stringent regulatory requirements 
that are normally only applicable to banks and BHCs, including risk-based capital, leverage, 
liquidity, and risk management requirements. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(b)(1) (2019) (developing 
prudential standards for enhanced supervision and prudential standards for nonbank financial 
companies). Initially, the FSOC designated four non-bank SIFIs—the insurance conglomerates 
Prudential, AIG and MetLife, as well as General Electric’s financial subsidiary GE Capital. See 
Jeremy C. Kress, The Last SIFI: The Unwise and Illegal Deregulation of Prudential Financial, 71 
STANFORD L. REV. ONLINE 171, 173 (2018) (arguing that Prudential’s declassification as SIFI was 
not only unwise but illegal). In response to this SIFI designation, AIG and GE Capital shrunk their 
asset portfolios and reduced their exposure to risk, and were de-designated SIFIs by the FSOC. Id. 
at 173–74. MetLife sued over its SIFI designation and won its case in district court. After the Trump 
administration took control, the FSOC dropped its appeal and allowed MetLife to avoid SIFI 
designation. Id. at 174. President Trump’s appointees to the FSOC were highly critical of Dodd-
Frank and its regulatory burden, and in October 2018, the FSOC formally de-designated Prudential 
as a SIFI. Id. at 174–75. As of today, there are no non-bank SIFIs despite a widespread view that 
many non-bank (and non-BHC) financial entities pose significant risks to the financial system. Id. 
at 176–81. 
263. See Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the Business 
of Banking, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1048–50 (2009) (discussing the historical meaning of the 
“business of banking”). 
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shareholders, even if this may be contrary to the broader goal of safety 
and soundness. 
In short, the separation of governance from safety and soundness 
regulation is a historical accident lacking any persuasive policy 
justification. There is simply no good argument for having a complex 
federal regime for limiting the risk of leveraged financial companies and 
a separate stand-alone body of state corporate law that guides the 
incentives of the people that run these leveraged financial institutions. It 
is long past time we reconciled and harmonized governance with the rest 
of banking regulation. 
C.  How Does Federal Law Already Impact Banking Governance? 
But before we can discuss how we might change federal laws and 
regulations to deemphasize shareholder wealth maximization in banking 
in favor of a stronger emphasis on safety and soundness, we must first 
understand what authorities already exist for federal regulators that might 
affect LFC governance. In addition to state fiduciary duties and federal 
statutory duties that directly apply to directors and officers of depository 
institutions, described in Part I, there are a number of federal laws and 
regulations that, while not directly impacting fiduciary duties, do affect 
the decision making of LFC directors and officers, as this section 
describes. These affect not only directors and officers of banks, but also 
bank holding companies (BHCs), financial holding companies (FHCs), 
and non-bank financial firms that are designated by financial regulators 
as “systemically important.” 
1.  CAMELS Examination Framework for Banks 
In addition to the statutory authorities allowing federal regulators to 
penalize or remove bank directors and officers, described supra,264 bank 
examiners wield significant discretionary authority over the directors and 
officers of depository institutions through their examination processes. 
US bank examinations largely revolve around capital levels and 
examination ratings. Examination ratings are assessed as a composite 
score based on so-called “CAMELS” factors: Capital adequacy, Asset 
quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market 
risk.265 Officially known as the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating 
System, this ratings system was first adopted by the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council, a formal interagency body of financial 
regulators that is empowered to prescribe uniform principles, standards, 
 
264. See supra text accompanying notes 112–23. 
265. See FDIC RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 258, at § 1.1-1 (listing the six 
financial and operational components evaluated to determine a financial institution’s composite 
rating). 
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and reports for the examinations of financial institutions,266 in 1979 and 
later updated in 1996.267 
Under the CAMELS rating system, a depository institution is assigned 
a composite rating between 1 and 5 (with 1 indicating the highest rating) 
based on assessments of the six CAMELS components.268 This 
CAMELS composite rating is meant to provide a uniform assessment of 
the soundness of banks and other depository institutions.269 A downgrade 
in a bank’s CAMELS rating has numerous negative consequences for a 
bank, including an increase in the rates paid on federal deposit 
insurance,270 and the loss of “well managed” status,271 which as 
described below can have potentially devastating consequences for the 
bank’s parent company.272 Less than satisfactory assessments for the 
different CAMELS components also trigger certain mandatory regulatory 
responses, such as a recapitalization requirement, restrictions on 
transactions with affiliates or asset growth, changes to management, and 
potentially forced divestment of affiliates.273 
As part of the CAMELS framework’s management component, banks 
are assessed on the capability and performance of their management and 
board of directors.274 Moreover, as financial regulators have made clear, 
 
266. About the FFIEC, FED. FIN. INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, 
https://www.ffiec.gov/about.htm [https://perma.cc/BV9R-CX9E]. 
267. See FDIC RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 258, at § 1.1-2 (discussing the history 
of the FFIEC’s Uniform Financial Institutions Ratings System). 
268. Id. § 1.1-3 (providing an overview of the UFIRS composite and component ratings 
methodology). 
269. See Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, FDIC Statement of Policy 5000, 
available at https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-900.html#fdic5000uniformfi 
[https://perma.cc/T3XE-6KAN]. 
270. See 81 Fed. Reg. 6108, 6109-6111 (Feb. 4, 2016) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 327). 
271. To qualify as well managed, a depository institution must have a composite rating of ‘1’ 
or ‘2’ and also have received a rating of ‘1’ or ‘2’ for the management component of the CAMELS 
rating. See 72 Fed. Reg. 17,798, 17,801 (Apr. 10, 2007) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 4, 208, 211, 337, 
347, and 563). 
272. See infra text accompanying notes 282–87 (discussing the Federal Reserve Board’s broad 
authority over financial institutions). 
273. See FDIC RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 258, at § 15.1-11. A downgrade in 
CAMELS works through two mechanisms. First, a decline in the institution’s capital to the next 
lowest threshold automatically triggers certain responses under the Prompt Corrective Action 
framework. Second, under Section 38(g) of the FDI Act, the FDIC may also reclassify an institution 
to the next lowest capital category (thus triggering PCA) if the FDIC determines that the institution 
is in an unsafe or unsound condition, or if the FDIC determines that the institution has less than 
satisfactory Asset quality, Management, Earnings, or Liquidity (the non-capital components of 
CAMELS). Id. at 15.1-10–11. 
274. See FDIC RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 258, at § 1.1-24–25. This evaluation 
is based on a number of factors, including the level and quality of oversight by the board and 
management; the ability of the board and management to plan for and respond to risks arising from 
changing business conditions or the initiation of new activities or products; the adequacy of internal 
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the management component “is given special consideration” in the 
overall evaluation of a depository institution’s soundness, as management 
is understood to be critical to the institution’s ability to respond to 
changing circumstances and mitigate risk accordingly.275 
2.  Bank Holding Companies and the Source of Strength Doctrine 
While the statutory provisions that allow for federal regulators to 
penalize or remove bank directors and officers do not apply to the 
directors and officers of bank holding companies,276 the longstanding 
“source of strength doctrine” provides some basis for asserting authority 
over these decision makers. The source of strength doctrine is derived 
from a 1978 Supreme Court decision that allowed the Federal Reserve 
Board to deny a BHC application based on the determination that the 
applicant holding company “would not be a sufficient source of financial 
and managerial strength to its subsidiary Bank.”277 This doctrine was 
later promulgated into rulemaking with the 1984 addition of section 
225.4(a)(1) to Regulation Y, which governs bank holding companies.278 
This section simply states that a “bank holding company shall serve as a 
source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary banks and 
shall not conduct its operations in an unsafe or unsound manner.”279 The 
Dodd-Frank Act codified this source of strength doctrine into statute in 
2010.280 
While the source of strength doctrine does not explicitly provide the 
Federal Reserve Board with the authority to penalize or remove BHC 
directors, it is generally understood to impose at least some type of duty 
to refrain from unsafe or unsound conduct.281 However, it is not clear 
 
policies and controls addressing the operations and risks of significant activities; and a number of 
other items. Id. at 1.1-25–26. Shareholder wealth maximization and its concomitant pressures to 
potentially take on greater risk are not evaluated as a factor. Id. 
275. See Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, FDIC Statement of Policy 5000, supra 
note 269. 
276. While 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(3) explicitly states that the authority to issue cease-and-desist 
orders, removal orders, and civil penalties under § 1818 extends to bank holding companies, it does 
not extend this authority to the directors and officers of BHCs. Rather, as is made clear in 
§ 1818(b)(1) and elsewhere, these enforcement options are available for “institution-affiliated 
parties,” a category that includes directors and officers of insured depository institutions, but not 
directors or officers or BHCs. See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u) (2019). 
277. Bd. of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 252 (1978) (citing S. REP. 
NO. 95-323, at 11 (1977)). 
278. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1) (2016). 
279. Id. 
280. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376, 1616 (2010), § 616(d) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1830o-1 (2019)). 
281. See, e.g., Paul L. Lee, Directors’ Duty to Monitor: Experience in the Banking Sector—
Part II, 133 BANKING L.J. 483, 492 (2016) (“The safety and soundness requirements applicable to 
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how strong this duty is, particularly given the Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
MCorp Financial, where the court held that the Federal Reserve’s 
interpretation of its source of strength doctrine as requiring a BHC to 
provide funds to prop up its struggling bank subsidiaries “would amount 
to a wasting of the holding company’s assets in violation of its duty to its 
shareholders.”282 As the MCorp Financial decision makes clear, the mere 
assertion of the source of strength doctrine does not eliminate the 
fiduciary duties owed to shareholders under state law by BHC directors. 
That said, the source of strength doctrine at least provides some formal 
guidance to BHC directors that the consideration of safe and sound 
practices is appropriate in their decision making. Comparable guidance 
does not exist for directors of non-financial corporations. 
3.  FHC “Well Capitalized” and “Well Managed” Requirements 
As described in Part I, Gramm-Leach-Bliley created a new category of 
bank holding company called a financial holding company that, unlike 
other BHCs, would be allowed to own and operate affiliates that engaged 
in activities that were not “closely related to banking,” including 
securities and insurance.283 As with BHCs, there are no specific 
provisions calling for penalties or removals against FHC directors or 
officers for unsafe or unsound conduct. However, to be approved for FHC 
status, a BHC and all of its bank subsidiaries must be well capitalized and 
well managed.284 
Relatedly, to retain FHC status, at least in theory, the company and its 
bank subsidiaries must remain well capitalized and well managed, as 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley specifically authorizes the Federal Reserve Board 
to take action against any FHC that is non-compliant with the well 
capitalized or well managed standards.285 This authority is broad and 
includes any limitation on the conduct or activities of the FHC or its 
affiliates that the Federal Reserve Board “determines to be appropriate 
under the circumstances.”286 Moreover, if a FHC remains out of 
compliance with these requirements for 180 days or more, the Fed is 
explicitly given the discretionary authority to revoke the company’s FHC 
status and force the divestiture of any (or all) of its bank subsidiaries.287 
 
the directors of a bank are in effect transposed [by the source of strength doctrine] to the directors 
of a bank holding company as well.”). 
282. MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 
1990), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 502 U.S. 32 (1991). 
283. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (2019). 
284. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1). 
285. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m). 
286. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(3). 
287. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(4). 
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The Federal Reserve Board has never actually exercised this authority,288 
but the threat of losing FHC status and being forced to divest bank 
subsidiaries should provide at least some theoretical incentive for FHC 
directors to consider the safety and soundness of the company and its 
bank subsidiaries. 
4.  Dodd-Frank and Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
The Dodd-Frank Act was enacted in response to the 2007–08 financial 
crisis and, among other things, created a new set of regulatory 
responsibilities for all bank holding companies with total consolidated 
assets of $50 billion or more, as well as any other financial firm 
designated as systemically important by the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council.289 These “systemically important financial institutions” or 
“SIFIs” are subject to enhanced prudential regulation, which includes 
heightened risk-based capital requirements, liquidity requirements, risk 
management requirements, and the submission of resolution plans (so-
called “living wills”), among other things.290 
a.  Living Will Requirement 
The living will requirement, laid out in Section 165(d) of Dodd-Frank, 
requires that each SIFI submit a plan to the Federal Reserve Board and 
FDIC for the rapid and orderly resolution of the company in the event it 
is near insolvency.291 This living will must be expressly approved by the 
company’s board of directors,292 and is expected to provide a detailed 
plan for a rapid and orderly resolution of the company, with supporting 
analysis across a number of areas, including as to the company’s 
organizational structure and liabilities,293 its management information 
systems (including risk management, accounting, and regulatory 
reporting),294 its interconnectedness with other entities,295 and the key 
 
288. See Jeremy Kress, BankThink: Fed Should Force Wells Fargo Into Being a Simpler Bank, 
AM. BANKER (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/fed-should-force-wells-
fargo-into-being-a-simpler-bank [https://perma.cc/87RP-BUS5] (“The Federal Reserve . . . has 
never publicly rescinded a firm’s FHC status.”). 
289. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5325 (2019)); see also MARC LABONTE & 
DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45036, BANK SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATION: THE 
$50 BILLION THRESHOLD IN THE DODD-FRANK ACT 2 (2017) (noting those financial institutions 
subject to enhanced prudential regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act). 
290. Dodd-Frank § 165, 124 Stat. 1376. 
291. Dodd-Frank § 165(d), 124 Stat. 1376. The Fed and FDIC adopted a final rule implementing 
this statute in November 2011. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,323 (Nov. 1, 2011) 
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 243). 
292. 12 C.F.R. § 243.3(e). 
293. 12 C.F.R. § 243.4(e). 
294. § 243.4(f). 
295. § 243.4(g). 
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assumptions used in its analysis.296 Importantly for purposes of this 
Article, the living will requirement also requires the submission of a 
detailed description of “[h]ow resolution planning is integrated into the 
corporate governance structure and processes of the covered 
company.”297 
While the living will requirement explicitly eschews a private right of 
action,298 it does provide financial regulators with broad enforcement 
authorities over SIFIs that fail to timely submit a satisfactory resolution 
plan.299 These enforcement authorities include the imposition of more 
stringent capital, leverage, or liquidity requirements, or restrictions on the 
growth, activities or operations of the company or its subsidiaries.300 In 
extreme cases, financial regulators are authorized to order the divestment 
of any such assets or operations deemed appropriate.301 While not 
affecting fiduciary duties, the living will requirement may provide 
additional incentives for SIFI directors to closely consider the safety and 
soundness of the company’s governance, operations and activities. 
b.  Capital and Liquidity Risk Management 
Utilizing its authority under Dodd-Frank and other federal statutes, the 
Federal Reserve has been quite active in adopting new safety and 
soundness rules and requirements for SIFIs, in the form of various capital, 
liquidity, and stress testing requirements that impose affirmative 
responsibilities on the directors and officers of large BHCs and 
sometimes also systemically important nonbank financial companies. 
One important such rule is the Federal Reserve Board’s adoption of the 
Capital Planning Rule,302 which requires that all SIFIs303 develop and 
maintain a capital plan.304 Under this rule, the SIFI’s board of directors, 
or a designated committee of the board, must submit a comprehensive 
capital plan each year.305 In its release of the final rule, the Federal 
Reserve Board seemed to express a view that the capital planning 
requirement merely augmented the existing fiduciary duties already owed 
by SIFI directors and officers, stating: 
 
296. § 243.4(c). 
297. § 243.4(d). 
298. 12 C.F.R. § 243.8(b). 
299. 12 C.F.R. § 243.6. 
300. Id. 
301. 12 C.F.R. § 243.6(c). 
302. Capital Planning, 12 C.F.R. § 225.8 (2020). 
303. This includes any BHCs with more than $50 billion in total consolidated assets as well as 
any nonbank financial company designated as systemically important by the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.8(b), 225.8(d)(11). 
304. 12 C.F.R. § 225.8(e)(1)(i). 
305. § 225.8(e)(1)(iii)(C). 
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As part of their fiduciary responsibilities to a bank holding company, 
the board of directors and senior management bear the primary 
responsibility for developing, implementing, and monitoring a bank 
holding company’s capital planning strategies and internal capital 
adequacy process. The final rule does not diminish that responsibility. 
Rather, the final rule is designed to (i) establish common minimum 
supervisory standards for such strategies and processes for certain large 
bank holding companies; (ii) describe how boards of directors and 
senior management of these bank holding companies should 
communicate the strategies and processes, including any material 
changes thereto, to the Federal Reserve; and (iii) provide the Federal 
Reserve with an opportunity to review large bank holding companies’ 
proposed capital distributions under certain circumstances.306 
Whether or not there is an existing fiduciary duty of safety and 
soundness owed by SIFI directors and officers, the Federal Reserve 
Board has made clear, both with this rule and also with subsequent 
interpretative guidance, that it has high expectations for these corporate 
decision makers and their role in planning and overseeing the company’s 
capital adequacy.307 
Directors and officers of large BHCs also have regulatory 
responsibilities to ensure that the firm is sufficiently managing its 
liquidity risk. Under authority provided by Dodd-Frank,308 the Federal 
Reserve has established liquidity risk management responsibilities for the 
directors and officers of BHCs with more than $50 billion in consolidated 
assets.309 Directors of such firms are responsible for approving the firm’s 
appropriate level of liquidity risk and periodically reviewing information 
provided by senior management related to the company’s liquidity risk 
management.310 The rule has more heightened responsibilities for senior 
managers, who are required to establish, develop, and implement 
liquidity risk management policies, including measurement and reporting 
systems, a review of significant or new products and business lines and 
their effects on the company’s liquidity risk profile and its cash flow 
projections, among other things, and regular liquidity stress testing.311 
 
306. Capital Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 74,631, 74,632 (Dec. 1, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.8). 
307. See, e.g., BD. GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS., SR 15-18, FEDERAL RESERVE 
SUPERVISORY ASSESSMENT OF CAPITAL PLANNING AND POSITIONS FOR LISCC FIRMS AND 
LARGE AND COMPLEX FIRMS 4–6 (Dec. 18, 2015) (describing the Federal Reserve Board’s 
expectations of the board and senior management in developing and implementing capital and risk 
management policies and stating the Fed’s view that the “board of directors is ultimately 
responsible and accountable for the firm’s capital-related decisions and for capital planning”). 
308. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 
§ 165(b)(1)(A)(ii), 124 Stat. 1376, 1424 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2019)). 
309. Liquidity Risk-Management Requirements, 12 C.F.R. § 252.34 (2016). 
310. § 252.34(a). 
311. § 252.34(c). 
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As one observer has described, given the high priority that the Federal 
Reserve Board and other financial regulators have placed on liquidity risk 
management, “[r]igorous oversight of management’s processes for 
liquidity risk management must thus be a high priority for the board of 
every large banking institution.”312 
c.  Risk Committee Requirement 
Dodd-Frank also directly impacts the board structure and governance 
of SIFIs, by directing the Federal Reserve Board to issue regulations 
requiring that all BHCs with consolidated assets of more than $10 billion 
and all nonbank SIFIs establish a risk committee that must include at least 
one risk management expert and which is responsible for overseeing the 
risk management practices of the entire company.313 The Federal Reserve 
has created two risk committee standards, one for BHCs with more than 
$10 billion but less than $50 billion in consolidated assets,314 and the 
other for BHCs with more than $50 billion in consolidated assets.315 
BHCs with more than $10 billion in consolidated assets are required to 
maintain a risk committee,316 chaired by an independent director and 
including at least one member with experience in risk management for 
large, complex firms.317 This risk committee is responsible for, among 
other things, establishing a risk management framework including 
policies and procedures for the establishment, implementation and 
compliance with risk management governance.318 A company must have 
a formal written charter approved by the company’s board and must meet 
at least quarterly.319 
A BHC with more than $50 billion in consolidated assets is subject to 
these same requirements,320 but its risk committee must also be an 
independent, stand-alone committee whose sole and exclusive 
responsibility is overseeing the BHC’s risk management practices, 
policies, and framework.321 Furthermore, in addition to the requirement 
that the risk committee have an independent chair and a member who has 
experience in risk management for large, complex firms,322 BHCs with 
 
312. Lee, supra note 281, at 511. 
313. Dodd-Frank § 165(h), 124 Stat. 1376. 
314. Risk Committee Requirement for Publicly Traded Bank Holding Companies with Total 
Consolidated Assets of $10 Billion or More, 12 C.F.R. § 252.22 (2016). 
315. Risk-Management and Risk Committee Requirements, 12 C.F.R. § 252.33 (2016). 
316. 12 C.F.R. § 252.22(a). 
317. § 252.22(d). 
318. § 252.22(b). 
319. § 252.22(c). 
320. 12 C.F.R. § 252.33(a). 
321. § 252.33(a)(3)(ii). 
322. § 252.33(a)(4). 
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more than $50 billion in consolidated assets must also have a chief risk 
officer with risk management experience for large, complex firms.323 
This chief risk officer is responsible for overseeing the establishment of 
and compliance with risk limits across the company, and otherwise 
managing and overseeing the company’s risk management practices, 
policies, and risk control framework.324 The chief risk officer’s 
compensation must be commensurate with her responsibilities and she 
should report directly to both the risk committee and chief executive 
officer of the company.325 
5.  Heightened Governance Standards for Holding Companies 
In addition to the regulatory changes directly authorized under Dodd-
Frank, financial regulators have utilized their existing authorities to adopt 
changes to their expectations for the directors and senior managers of 
large banking institutions. As described supra in Part I.C.4, the OCC 
promulgated new guidelines laying out its heightened expectations for 
corporate governance at large national banks.326 The Federal Reserve 
recently issued similar guidance for the directors and officers of large 
complex BHCs as part of their overall examination process.327 
Under the previous examination regime, dubbed RFI/C(D),328 the 
Federal Reserve Board assigned each BHC and FHC a composite rating 
(“C”),329 which was to be based on three essential component ratings: 
Risk management (“R”), which itself is made up of four 
subcomponents: (a) competence of the board of directors and senior 
management; (b) policies and procedures; (c) risk monitoring and 
management information systems; and (d) internal controls.330 
Financial condition of the holding company (“F”), to be assigned based 
on the Fed’s evaluation of the financial strength of the consolidated 
organization, with support for this evaluation coming from four 
subcomponents collectively known as CAEL: (C) capital; A (asset 
quality); E (earnings); and L (liquidity).331 
Impact (“I”) of the parent company and its nondepository subsidiaries 
on the strength of its depository institution subsidiaries.332 
 
323. § 252.33(b)(1). 
324. § 252.33(b)(2). 
325. § 252.33(b)(3). 
326. See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text. 
327. Proposed Supervisory Guidance, 83 Fed. Reg. 1351, 1351 (Jan. 11, 2018). 
328. Bank Holding Company Rating System, 69 Fed. Reg. 43,996, 43,997 (July 23, 2004). 
329. Id. at 43,997. 
330. Id. at 43,998. 
331. Id. at 43,998–99. 
332. Id. at 43,999. This component is meant to assess whether the holding company is able to 
serve as a source of strength for its depository institutions, as described supra in notes 264–82 and 
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An additional fourth rating, (Depository Institutions) (“D”), looks to 
the strength of the company’s subsidiary depository institutions, as 
reflected by the examination ratings given by those institutions’ primary 
regulators.333 
In November 2018, the Federal Reserve Board issued a final rule 
replacing RFI/C(D) for large financial institutions, including bank 
holding companies with consolidated assets of more than $100 billion, 
with a new examinations approach.334 This large financial institution 
(LFI) rating system eliminates the composite rating approach used under 
RFI/C(D) and replaces it with three component ratings: Capital Planning 
and Positions; Liquidity Risk Management and Positions; and 
Governance and Controls.335 The Governance and Controls component 
rating evaluates the effectiveness of a firm’s board of directors; its 
management of business lines and independent risk management and 
controls; and for a large systemically important firm, its recovery 
planning.336 Directors are expected to closely oversee the firm’s strategy 
and risk management, hold senior management accountable, support 
independent risk management and internal auditing, and maintain a 
capable board composition and governance structure.337 Moreover, and 
in contrast with the previous RFI/C(D) regime, the Federal Reserve 
Board’s LFI examinations framework does not simply confine regulatory 
assessments of the firm’s management to a single component. For a firm 
to be considered “well managed” under the new LFI framework, it must 
receive satisfactory results for each of its three component ratings.338 
In addition to the introduction of the LFI examination ratings system, 
the Fed also introduced a proposed guidance on supervisory expectations 
for boards of directors, which set forth expected attributes of an effective 
 
accompanying text, or whether it might have issues that could deteriorate the strength of these 
depository institutions. Satish M. Kini, New Bank Holding Company Rating System Revises the 
Focus of the Federal Reserve’s Supervisory Practices, 121 BANKING L.J. 784, 788 (2004). 
333. 69 Fed. Reg. at 44,000. This rating uses the CAMELS rating assigned by the institution’s 
primary banking regulator, as described infra. RFI/C(D) itself replaced the “BOPEC” rating system 
that was previously utilized by the Federal Reserve Board. See Kini, supra note 332, at 784. 
334. Large Financial Institution Rating System; Regulations K and LL, 83 Fed. Reg. 58,724, 
58,724 (Nov. 21, 2018). The rating changes described in this rule also apply to non-insurance, non-
commercial savings and loan holding companies with consolidated assets of $100 billion or more, 
and certain US intermediate holding companies of foreign banking organizations with total 
consolidated assets of $50 billion or more. Id. 
335. 83 Fed. Reg. at 58,727. 
336. Id. at 58,738. 
337. Id. 
338. Id. at 58,735. There are four ratings levels in the new LFI framework: “Broadly Meets 
Expectations,” “Conditionally Meets Expectations,” “Deficient-1,” and “Deficient-2.” For a firm 
to be considered “well managed,” it must be rated Broadly Meets Expectations or Conditionally 
Meets Expectations for each of the three components. Id. 
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board of directors for LFIs.339 While this proposed guidance has not yet 
been finalized, it nevertheless provides some important insight into the 
Federal Reserve Board’s view of its ability to impact corporate 
governance at large financial institutions. The proposed guidance has 
three parts. The first part provides proposed guidance for LFI boards of 
directors, clearly distinguishing these expectations from those of senior 
management, and identifies five attributes that the Fed will use in 
assessing these boards.340 The second part applies to directors of all 
BHCs and aims to revise and focus its guidance on supervisory 
expectations for boards of directors.341 The third part would apply to all 
Fed-supervised institutions and aims to clarify the process that Fed 
examiners and supervisory staff should follow in communicating their 
findings to an institution’s board of directors and senior management.342 
As with the new LFI examinations rating framework, the proposed 
supervisory expectations guidance illustrates the Fed’s intention to 
become more deeply involved in the governance processes and expected 
goals of directors and senior officers of large financial institutions, and 
clearly highlights the Fed’s belief that it has the authority to do so. 
As this section describes, there are a number of regulatory tools that 
affect LFC governance either directly or by impacting the actions of 
directors and officers. But these do not directly affect fiduciary duties, 
nor do they aim to alter the primary goal that directors believe they must 
serve of maximizing shareholder wealth. Indeed, the Dodd-Frank Act 
explicitly states that it does not change director fiduciary duties in the 
context of changes to executive compensation.343 That being said, 
existing regulatory authority does provide financial regulators with 
significant leeway to implement more direct steps to change LFC 
governance. 
D.  Implementing Federal Reforms to Banking Governance 
If we accept the argument that federalization is the most efficient and 
appropriate pathway towards reforming banking governance, how might 
 
339. Proposed Guidance on Supervisory Expectations for Boards of Directors, 82 Fed. Reg. 
37,219 (Aug. 9, 2017). 
340. Id. at 37,220. These attributes are: (1) Set clear, aligned, and consistent direction regarding 
the firm’s strategy and risk tolerance; (2) actively manage information flow and board discussions; 
(3) hold senior management accountable; (4) support the independence and stature of independent 
risk management; and (5) maintain a capable board composition and governance structure. Id. 
341. Id. at 37,220–22. Specifically, the goal of this part is to revise the outstanding Supervision 
and Regulation (SR) letters to eliminate confusing or contrary guidance and allow directors to better 
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342. Id. at 37,222–23. 
343. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 951, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (2010) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 78n–1 et seq. (2019)). 
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we best proceed in this regard, taking into account the federal authorities 
already in place? In this section, I outline the broad strokes of three 
pathways to implement changes to federal fiduciary duties. First, federal 
banking regulators, utilizing their existing regulatory powers, can insist 
on or incentivize changes in LFC governance priorities. Second, 
Congress could create a new governance regime directly impacting 
fiduciary duties or other aspects affecting LFC boards and senior 
management, preempting existing state laws in these areas. Finally, 
Congress could establish a federal charter for LFCs, akin to the charters 
that exist for national banks. 
1.  Changing Fiduciary Duties Through Existing Regulatory Authority 
One potential pathway for changing LFC fiduciary duties is to exercise 
existing regulatory authorities to require or strongly encourage changes 
to governance incentives. As I have described above, financial regulators 
already have significant discretionary regulatory power over the 
institutions they regulate, a group which includes banks, bank holding 
companies, financial holding companies, and certain systemically 
important nonbank financial firms. Management and governance are 
already used by federal banking regulators as key criteria to assess the 
safety and soundness of these institutions. As such, changes in 
supervisory expectations that emphasize a more balanced approach to 
LFC governance could be implemented without new legislation and 
through a relatively simpler notice-and-comment process. 
One mechanism by which governance changes could be encouraged is 
through changes to how regulators consider the soundness of a financial 
institution’s management. As described previously, the CAMELS 
examination framework for banks,344 the RFI/C(D) framework for BHCs 
with consolidated assets of $100 billion or less,345 and the LFI framework 
for BHCs with more than $100 billion in consolidated assets346 all 
already explicitly consider management in assessing the overall health of 
the regulated institution. Similarly, the requirement that FHCs (which is 
the organizational form for nearly all systemically important financial 
institutions) be “well managed”347 also gives regulatory assessments of 
firm governance powerful sway. Given the arguments against an 
unmitigated shareholder wealth maximization paradigm in LFC 
governance, adjusting the factors by which management is assessed so 
that shareholder wealth maximization is de-emphasized could potentially 
have great impact on these firms’ internal decision-making processes. 
 
344. See supra notes 264–75 and accompanying text. 
345. See supra notes 330–33 and accompanying text. 
346. See supra notes 334–38 and accompanying text. 
347. See supra notes 283–87 and accompanying text. 
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Indeed, it is possible that such regulatory changes could even spur 
changes to the fiduciary duties owed by LFC directors and officers under 
state law. Law professors Claire Hill and Richard Painter have proposed 
the negotiation and implementation of covenants between LFCs and their 
highly paid executives that would provide for a personal guarantee by 
these executives on losses incurred by the LFC in the event of 
insolvency.348 The idea here is that private contracts could be used to 
better align the incentives of bankers with bank creditors.349 And while 
the covenants proposed by Hill & Painter have a relatively narrow scope, 
limited to executive liability, one could imagine covenants being used to 
adopt more broad-based governance changes by creating express 
contracts with corporate stakeholders that expressly trump the default 
rules of corporate law. For example, a corporation might consider issuing 
classes of stock shares that contain express language specifying that the 
holders of those shares are not owed a fiduciary duty. 
Another means by which financial institutions could implement 
governance changes is by incorporating as, or reincorporating as, a 
benefit corporation. The increasingly broad adoption of state benefit 
corporation laws provides another avenue through which shareholder 
wealth maximization could specifically be disclaimed as a guiding duty 
for LFC directors and officers.350 Benefit corporations—or “B-corps” as 
they are often called—are organized as for-profit corporations that 
specifically call for the consideration of the interests of both non-
shareholder stakeholders and shareholders by the board of directors.351 
B-corps and covenants between the corporation and its various 
stakeholders provide a potential vehicle for the express consideration of 
a leveraged financial company’s safety and soundness, and the interests 
of its creditors. 
As Hill & Painter note, it is not clear what motivation financial 
institutions would have to negotiate covenants of the kind they call for,352 
and a similar question exists for why any financial institution would 
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consider incorporating as a B-corp. But simple changes to the criteria by 
which banking regulators assess the management of their regulated 
institutions could potentially spur these types of governance changes. By 
expressly factoring in fiduciary duties—and negatively assessing an 
excessive fealty to shareholder wealth maximization—as part of their 
examinations processes, banking regulators may be able to encourage 
their regulated institutions to take affirmative steps to mitigate the 
shareholder primacy norm. 
2.  Federalizing Fiduciary Duties in Banking 
While encouraging LFCs to adopt changes to their governance norms 
through regulatory pressure may be a worthwhile goal, this is unlikely to 
lead to any kind of wholesale adoption of changes in fiduciary duties. To 
achieve the types of systemic changes necessary to meaningfully address 
the governance problems in banking, some kind of mandatory solution 
that applies to all financial institutions (or some subset of them) is 
probably necessary. One obvious avenue is to enact legislation creating a 
federal regime for fiduciary duties of LFC directors and officers. 
Such an approach would be consistent with our country’s long history 
of maintaining a distinct and separate body of law outlining the 
responsibilities and duties of bank directors and officers.353 As I 
described in Part I, to the extent that banking activities have been allowed 
to occur outside of regulated institutions with bank charters, this has been 
the result of regulatory arbitrage and historical happenstance and not 
based on any coherent policy rationale.354 A federal regime for LFC 
fiduciary duties that deemphasized shareholder primacy norms and 
placed greater weight on safety and soundness would align the internal 
incentives of LFC decision makers with the broader regulatory goals of 
prudential oversight that we think are worthwhile for LFCs. If it makes 
sense to enact myriad bills to increase and improve the safety and 
soundness regulations imposed on leveraged financial institutions due to 
the systemic risk they pose, then it would seem to make just as much 
sense to adopt changes that would align the internal incentives of the 
directors and officers of those institutions with these same policy goals. 
At the same time, Congress clearly has the power to create express 
laws that affect fiduciary duties. For example, Congress has created 
fiduciary duties for investment advisors under Section 206 of the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.355 Section 206 prohibits investment 
advisers from employing or engaging in any action that operates as a 
 
353. See supra Sections I.B–C (contrasting the limited liability of bank shareholders in Part I.B, 
with the fiduciary duties expected of directors and officers in Part I.C). 
354. See supra Sections I.D–E. 
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fraud or deceit on a client, and also requires that investment advisers 
disclose any potential conflicts they may have in any transaction 
involving a client.356 The Supreme Court has interpreted this language as 
imposing an affirmative duty of good faith and full and fair disclosure of 
all material facts, as well as an affirmative duty of reasonable care to 
avoid misleading the client.357 
Finally, it is worth noting that Congressional legislation creating 
fiduciary duties for banks and other LFCs would restore the status quo 
that had long existed prior to Congress’s enactment of FIRREA in 1989. 
Until that point, fiduciary duties for national bank directors were 
controlled by federal common law. As I describe in Part I.C. above, 
FIRREA Section 1821(k) effectively eliminated federal fiduciary duties 
for national banks and replaced these with state law. Reestablishing 
federal governance priorities for banks and other LFCs would, at least at 
a high level, simply reverse these changes. 
3.  A Federal Charter for LFCs 
Finally, Congress could go further and establish a federal charter 
requirement, akin to the national banking charters issued by the OCC, for 
any business that was engaged in the “business of banking,” utilizing an 
expansive view of this term to cover firms that have high leverage, which 
enjoy implicit government guarantees on their short term debt, and/or 
which pose a substantial risk to the broader financial system or 
macroeconomy. Such legislation would be consistent with the original 
and longstanding goals of US banking law, which has historically sought 
to segregate the formation and activities of banking firms into a separate 
and unique charter. It would also effectively reverse the regulatory 
arbitrage that has allowed so much of the “business of banking” to occur 
outside of the regulated firms we call banks.358 
Once upon a time, bank charters were judiciously granted and only 
those firms with a charter were allowed to engage in the business of 
banking.359 Banks themselves were prohibited from engaging in riskier 
activities, and this prohibition extended to the activities undertaken by 
their affiliates or their directors and officers.360 But as I have described 
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in this Article, bank charters have become less and less important in the 
context of the banking system over time. Creating a new charter for firms 
that engage in banking would be consistent with the broader purposes of 
banking law and would help to reconcile the governance of banking firms 
with their external regulations. 
E.  Constructing a Federal Fiduciary Duty Framework 
Regardless of how a federal fiduciary duty framework is created for 
banking firms, what should this framework look like? To achieve the 
goals for banking governance set forth in this Article, federal reforms of 
banking fiduciary duties should expressly embrace four principles. First, 
these reforms should reflect the view long held by federal banking 
regulators that bank directors and officers owe a duty of safety and 
soundness that must be emphasized above all other duties, including 
shareholder wealth maximization. Second, these duties should be 
expanded to include not only the directors and officers of banks—i.e., 
depository institutions—but also other financial institutions that share the 
characteristics (and thus systemic vulnerabilities) of banks, including 
high leverage, implied or express government guarantees on their short 
term debt, and the creation of negative externalities by their failures.361 
Third, to ensure that banking directors and officers are appropriately 
incentivized to prioritize safety and soundness, the standard of care 
should be one of simple negligence and not gross negligence. Finally, 
breaching these duties should not only subject directors and officers to 
liability from regulators but should also create a private right of action 
that can be asserted by depositors and other creditors holding short-term 
debt obligations issued by the LFC. I describe each of these principles in 
turn below. 
1.  Safety and Soundness Primacy 
As described above, federal banking regulators have long asserted that 
directors and officers of banking institutions owe a duty of safety and 
soundness that supersedes other fiduciary duties.362 While this assertion 
may be unsupported by state case law,363 it is consistent with the goals 
of the significant body of federal safety and soundness law that seeks to 
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reduce the risk of leveraged financial companies. Given the enormous 
costs of financial crises, including the 2007–08 financial crisis, which has 
cost every American $70,000 according to one recent study,364 there is 
significant reason to think that increasing the safety and soundness of 
banking institutions should be a top policy priority. As I have argued 
above, shareholder primacy is inappropriate for banking firms for a 
number of reasons. Given the strong policy weight we have given to 
safety and soundness at banking firms, this policy goal should be 
reflected in the internal governance priorities of the firm. Any federal 
changes to the fiduciary duties of banking firms should reflect the long-
held view of federal banking regulators and expressly state that LFC 
directors and officers owe a duty of safety and soundness that supersedes 
any other duties they might hold. This duty would be similar in some 
ways to the prohibitions on unsafe or unsound conduct described above 
in Part I.C.4, but would be expressly structured as a fiduciary duty, with 
open-ended liability as opposed to statutory penalties in the event of a 
breach of this duty. 
2.  Duty Extended to Other Leveraged Financial Companies 
Importantly, for changes in banking governance to be effective, they 
must target not only the directors and officers of banks but also those of 
other banking institutions. As I have described, the divergence between 
bank governance and the prudential regulation that accompanies banking 
activities occurred through historical path dependency and regulatory 
arbitrage, not because of any well considered policy rationale. Given the 
enormous role that non-bank governance structures play in the banking 
system (both traditional banking and shadow banking today)—whether 
through bank holding companies or non-bank financial firms—for any 
governance reforms to be successful in complementing and not 
contradicting the broader policy goals of systemic safety and soundness, 
they must be extended beyond chartered banks and onto other financial 
firms that pose a systemic risk. 
How broadly should governance reforms be applied? The easy answer 
is to simply apply any changes in banking fiduciary duties to all firms 
that are subject to safety and soundness oversight in the post-Dodd Frank 
financial regulatory framework, including banks, bank holding 
companies, and non-bank financial companies designated by the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council.365 Such an approach would be 
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consistent with the statutory framework for safety and soundness, as it 
would simply layer on fiduciary duty changes to financial firms that have 
already been identified as being appropriate subjects of such regulation 
by Congress. However, adopting this scope of financial firms covered by 
governance changes would also be potentially underinclusive insofar as 
it could exclude many firms for which the shareholder primacy norm is 
inappropriate. 
A more suitable approach might be to target any financial institutions 
that raise the concerns identified in Part II.B, which obviate the traditional 
rationales for shareholder primacy. If a firm has high leverage (and thus 
relatively high creditor agency costs), enjoys explicit or implicit 
government guarantees on its debt (thus posing direct costs to taxpayers), 
and creates negative external costs through its failure (thus creating costs 
to the broader financial system and economy), it should be covered by 
any changes in fiduciary duties that are meant to improve the governance 
incentives of banks. 
3.  Simple Negligence Rule 
As described above in Section I.C.1, prior to the New Deal-era reforms 
and the remarkable stability that they brought to the banking system, the 
courts were moving towards a simple negligence standard for bank 
director cases, curtailing the applicability of the business judgment rule. 
This trend was halted by the lack of bank liability cases during the mid-
twentieth century, and it was reversed by the enactment of FIRREA 
Section 1821(k), which effectively established a gross negligence 
standard for all bank directors.366 
Policy makers should consider a simple negligence standard for 
banking directors. As described above, banking firms are unique among 
business organizations insofar as they pose particular dangers to the 
financial system and broader economy. Given the critical importance of 
bank safety and soundness for our financial system and broader economy, 
it is worth adopting an approach that would more directly incentivize 
directors and officers to act in accordance with safety and soundness 
norms. 
4.  A Private Right of Action 
Finally, to ensure that any duty of safety and soundness is 
appropriately enforced, a private right of action should be strongly 
considered. Recent experience has starkly illustrated that we cannot 
simply rely on the discretion of financial regulators who, depending on 
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the ideological bent of the United States president who appointed them, 
may or may not be inclined to exercise their regulatory authorities. As the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission concluded in their definitive 
accounting of the 2007–08 financial crisis, regulators had “ample power” 
protect the financial system, but they chose not to exercise this 
authority.367 The FCIC Report states unequivocally: 
In case after case after case, regulators continued to rate the institutions 
they oversaw as safe and sound even in the face of mounting troubles, 
often downgrading them just before their collapse. And where 
regulators lacked authority, they could have sought it. Too often, they 
lacked the political will—in a political and ideological environment that 
constrained it—as well as the fortitude to critically challenge the 
institutions and the entire system they were entrusted to oversee.368 
To change the incentives of LFC directors and officers, these actors 
must believe that any breaches of a safety and soundness duty they might 
commit will actually and consistently be penalized. This cannot occur if 
federal regulators are the only actors with the ability to hold wayward 
directors and officers accountable. As we know from corporate law, a 
private right of action and its concomitant threat of litigation can be 
effective in policing the behavior of directors and officers.369 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has supported this idea in the context of shareholder suits 
alleging securities laws violations, stating: “Private enforcement of the 
proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to [SEC] action. . . the 
possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief serves as a most effective 
weapon in the enforcement of the proxy requirements.”370 
But who should hold this private right of action to sue for breach of a 
duty of safety and soundness? Clearly, it should not be shareholders, 
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since, as described above, shareholders may often have incentives to take 
on greater risk even if this is detrimental to the firm’s safety and 
soundness. And while holders of short-term debt may be well positioned 
in many ways to care about safety and soundness, the fact that they are 
often insulated against credit losses, either via express government 
guarantees (such as federal deposit insurance) or bailouts to prevent 
contagion, makes them poorly situated as potential plaintiffs. 
But uninsured creditors in intermediate-term LFC debt are well 
positioned to exercise a private right of action on breaches of a safety and 
soundness duty and can play an important role in holding directors and 
officers accountable. Indeed, there was a strong effort in the 1990s and 
2000s to encourage the issuance of more subordinated bank debt based 
on the idea that creditors in this type of debt would be ideal monitors of 
bank risk and an important source of market discipline.371 Because 
uninsured bank creditors have a fixed rate of return and are highly 
concerned with receiving back the entirety of their principal investment, 
and because, unlike insured depositors, they do not enjoy government 
guarantees on their investments, they have strong incentives to ensure 
that the bank avoids insolvency.372 
To be fair, the market discipline provided by investors in subordinated 
bank debt has not been particularly effective in limiting bank risk 
taking.373 In large part, the ineffectiveness of debt discipline has been due 
to the anemic and attenuated nature of the discipline being wielded. As a 
number of commentators have noted, debt discipline is necessarily ex 
post in nature, as it is a response to signals of rising risk rather than 
something exerted at the time that risk is being accrued.374 Moreover, 
debt discipline does not directly impact directors and officers, operating 
instead by decreasing liquidity or raising the cost of funding provided to 
the banking firm.375 That being said, I am more sanguine about the 
disciplinary effects of a private right of action arising out of a breach of 
a duty of safety and soundness. The possibility of personal liability 
arising from private litigation would have a much stronger effect on the 
decision making of LFC directors and officers than would the possibility 
of events that might harm the institution, due to the skin in the game 
involved. Indeed, increasing skin in the game for directors and officers 
 
371. Min, Market Discipline, supra note 1, at 1437–38. 
372. See Robert R. Bliss, Market Discipline: Players, Processes, and Purposes, in MARKET 
DISCIPLINE ACROSS COUNTRIES AND INDUSTRIES 37, 44 (Claudio Borio et al. eds., 2004). 
373. Min, Market Discipline, supra note 1, at 1458–62. 
374. Bliss, supra note 372, at 38–39; Mark J. Flannery, The Faces of “Market Discipline”, 20 
J. FIN. SERV. RESEARCH 107, 114 (2001). 
375. Min, Market Discipline, supra note 1, at 1439–40. 
2020] Federalizing Bank Governance 909 
has been an important goal for bank governance in the post-Dodd-Frank 
regulatory environment.376 
By empowering LFC creditors with a private right of action, 
lawmakers can help to ensure that there is a robust policing mechanism 
to keep directors and officers in line with changes to banking governance 
norms. 
CONCLUSION 
For too long, policy makers have blithely accepted the idea that the 
relationship between banking regulators and the directors and officers of 
banking firms must necessarily be an adversarial one. This has led to a 
“cat-and-mouse” dynamic in which federal regulators must affirmatively 
identify and address excessive risk, even as the directors and officers of 
the firms they oversee are incentivized to take on greater risk on behalf 
of their shareholders. As recent events have made clear, this dynamic is 
detrimental to the critical goals of macroprudential stability that are at the 
forefront of banking policy today. 
Realigning the incentives of banking governance so that safety and 
soundness is expressly prioritized over other concerns would change the 
paradigm of banking and eliminate the adversarial relationship between 
banks and their regulators. While not a panacea for banking instability, 
such changes would go a long way towards improving overall financial 
stability. 
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